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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the transatlantic security divide through the strategic 
culture lens, taking a comparative case study approach. It analyzes the emergent 
EU strategic culture by looking at the European Security Strategy, European 
security elite speeches, and ESDP operations. It examines the same evidence to 
determine the predominant trends in American strategic culture during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and finds the greatest divide in the ideational foundation of 
operations, particularly as concerns perceptions of legitimacy.  In the area of 
multilateralism, there is a greater similarity than is usually argued as concerns ad 
hoc coalitions of the willing: the EU forms coalitions with non-EU partners, allows 
individual members to decide whether to contribute troops and thus carry 
financial obligations or not, and now opens up the possibility for ‘structured 
enhanced cooperation’ in ESDP, despite the legitimacy derived from 
institutionalized cooperation stressed in public.  The use of force only as a last 
resort is upheld by both in public diplomacy; however, in reality both keep all 
options open of when to act, even though the EU does stress less the use of 
force and more crisis prevention and non-military tools, while the U.S. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The analysis and assessment of differences of policy and strategy across 
the Atlantic have a prominent place in security studies since the foundation of 
NATO in 1949.1  The maintenance of consensus among statesmen, 
parliamentarians and generals and internal crisis management in instances of 
sharp division kept this divide from becoming too large, despite constant fear by 
all concerned of the collapse of the alliance. Such policy helped win the Cold War 
and transformed the world from a bi-polar structure to the U.S. predominance of 
the recent past.  Realist theory predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union would 
fatally wound NATO, due to the loss of its raison d’être.2  The outbreak of peace 
would in turn widen the divide between each side of the Atlantic.  Despite the 
most dim scenarios painted by theorists, pundits, and political wags, NATO has 
not passed away since 1989, but has instead seen its first peace support 
operations, including combat, to say nothing of its enlargements in 1999 and 
2004.  What has taken place since 1989, however, is a widening of the divide 
between the two sides of the Atlantic – especially since the U.S. decision to 
invade Iraq.  In particular, the United States’ post 9/11 doctrine of preemption is 
the polar opposite of the European propensity for extensive diplomacy, 
multilateralism and a policy of prevention. 
                                            
1 See for example, Robert E. Osgood, NATO, the entangling alliance (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1962), Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership; a re-appraisal of the Atlantic 
alliance (New York: Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill, 1965), Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-
Shifting in NATO (London: M.E. Sharpe Co., 2003); Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New 
Europe”: The politics of international socialization after the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005); David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in 
International Security (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998); or Ryan C. 
Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the 
Cold War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006). 
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 
18, no. 2 (Autumn 1993): 75-76. 
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During the 1990s, the European Union (EU) gave birth to its own security 
policy and structures that enable it to act without the United States assistance or 
approval.3  The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
associated European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) provide the guidance 
and capacity to gather forces, allowing Europeans to forum shop between NATO 
and the EU when conducting security-related operations.  If identical ideas, 
policies, and methods drove Europeans and Americans to achieve similar 
objectives, conflicts between the two institutions should be minimal.  However, 
the proponents of U.S. unilateralism in conflict with the proponents of a policy of 
an EU third path in world politics, as well as painfully familiar conflicts of spheres 
of influence between the powers over the Middle East have meant that a number 
of areas of new, virulent contention have emerged.4  The outstanding example of 
this divide has been former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
referral in early 2003  to ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Europe in an obvious attempt to shift the 
divide so that it was not between the U.S. and Europe, but instead between the 
European countries --- one group of which was perceived to be closer to the 
U.S..5  While he was temporarily successful in garnering a few allies to support 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the basis of the “mission defines the coalition”, the 
divide between the U.S. and some continental European powers worsened 
surely for a couple of years and with little tangible benefit to anyone save the 
enemies of the U.S. and Europe.  Now that Rumsfeld, Schroeder and Chirac 
have exited the scene, a certain Atlantic rapprochement has occurred (notably  
 
 
                                            
3 Andrew Cottey, “The European Dimension of Defense Reform: From the WEU to the EU’s 
New Defense Role,” in Post-Cold War Defense Reform, eds. István Gyarmati and Theodor 
Winkler (Washington DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2002). 
4 David M. Andrews, ed., The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: power, culture, and change in 
American grand strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), Philip H. Gordon and 
Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 2004). 
5 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 128. 
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with the example of Sarkozy’s France), but one still must wonder whether a new 
phase of unexpected crisis as in 2002 and 2003 could not sunder relations once 
more.   
This study’s primary purpose is to assess the current state of the 
transatlantic security divide without resort to the pointless finger pointing and 
name calling that suffocated the era 2002-2005.  Specifically, this work attempts 
to uncover the different dispositions of Americans and Europeans as to the use 
of force, highlighted in the debate surrounding the invasion of Iraq.  What are the 
ideational driving forces behind EU-led missions, based on member-state 
consensus, and how do these motivational forces differ, if at all, from the 
American ones driving the invasion of Iraq?  It is easy to say that different sides 
of the Atlantic are motivated by different preferences, but this study pursues the 
more rigorous objective of framing these differences in the context of the corpus 
of social science theory. 
A. INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC CULTURE  
In order to assess these differences, this study will look at transatlantic 
relations through the social constructivist’s lens of strategic culture.  There are 
multiple definitions of strategic culture, but this study will use Christopher Meyer’s 
definition as a way to measure both the ideational roots of political behavior, as 
well as the behavior itself.  He defines strategic culture as  “the socially-
transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are 
shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given 
political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a 
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community’s pursuit of security and defense goals.”6  In his work assessing the 
convergence of national European strategic cultures, he focuses on four 
European countries and finds there to be a measurable degree of convergence 
between some areas of their respective strategic cultures.  This study will build 
on his findings, but concentrate on a different level of analysis.  It will compare 
the collectively shared corpus of norms, ideas and behavior of the emerging 
transnational European strategic culture as reflected in ESDP activities to the 
United States’ national strategic culture as reflected in the invasion of Iraq 
through a focused, comparative case study.   
While these two different levels of analysis – one a composite institutional 
actor, one a state actor – may at first seem incongruent to the task, the difference 
between the two levels hold less meaning to this study because of its focus on 
peace operations.  In the current world of international security operations, the 
United States and the European Union are arguably two of the most important 
actors.  That one of them is a state and the other is a conglomeration of states 
does not preclude an analysis focused on the ideational factors leading up to 
their policy declarations and behavioral decisions. The U.S. behavior is 
observable through unilateral or coalition operations and is comparable to 
collective European behavior visible through collectively authorized EU 
operations.  By understanding the different ideational roots guiding decision-
making on security operations on either side of the Atlantic, one can better 
understand the current state of the divergence between U.S. and European 
military action.  And from such a better understanding one can draw more 
                                            
6 Christopher O. Meyer. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on 
Security and Defense in the European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 20. Meyer 
derives his definition from definitions put forward by Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: 
the first generation of theory strikes back,” Review of International Studies 25 (1999), Alistair Iain 
Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995), Per 
M. Martinsen, “The European Security and Defense Strategy: A Strategic Culture in the Making,” 
paper presented at the ECPR conference (2003), 
http://www.esex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/generalconference/marburg/papers/17/1/Martinsen.pdf, last 
accessed March 2008, and Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of 
German Security Policy 1989-2003 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).  These 
definitions will be further discussed in the literature review. 
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appropriate policy recommendations aimed at reducing the divide should the 
United States wish to benefit from future cooperation with the European Union.   
In the past, any intra-Alliance dissent of how to react to world events was 
overshadowed by the Soviet threat, which provided strong incentives for the 
alliance to minimize internal conflict.  Within this context, Western Europe was 
utterly dependent on the U.S. for ultimate protection from an attack by the 
Warsaw Pact.  The Soviet threat was the glue that held the transatlantic alliance 
together regardless of internal differences.  Now that this glue is gone, the 
security environment has fundamentally changed, and a new security institution 
has arisen,  one must seek qualitatively to understand the impact of this 
phenomenon on transatlantic relations.  The focus here, however, is not on an 
institution, even though institutions and their accompanying theories provide 
valuable insight into EU culture.  Instead, the focus lies on the ideas guiding 
national and institutional behavior and their presence in the here and now of 
policy.  Such an effort has the signal virtue of allowing some rational assessment 
of means and ends without the regrettable tendency to suffocate in rhetoric and 
posturing.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
For the sake of the U.S. national interest, to say nothing of the wider 
interest and purposes which U.S. policy hopes to fulfill,  U.S. policy-makers must 
understand the emerging European strategic culture, its implications for U.S. and 
NATO policy and the specter of possible future conflict about ends and means 
that  it evokes. The political implications of the transatlantic rift further widening 
or, vice versa, narrowing again are far-ranging.  A rift that begins with 
disagreement over security-related operations could easily spill over to other 
areas of cooperation and world affairs, given the importance of these two 
partners.  U.S. cooperation with world partners is one of the most important 
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factors enabling the success of U.S. foreign policy endeavors.7  A U.S. and 
Europe who are united in their strategy would have a much greater chance of 
wielding influence in international affairs while a Europe opposed to U.S. policy 
could have substantial negative impact on U.S. achievement of its objectives.  By 
understanding more accurately the difference between these strategic cultures, 
decision-makers in the United States can modify policy decisions in order to 
maintain leadership vis-a-vis an increasingly independent European security 
apparatus.  U.S. policy makers can also understand how to align the ideational 
motives behind security operations in order to increase the chance of European 
cooperation.  The consideration of this divide is also important in the United 
States’ decision regarding the level of influence it wishes to yield over its 
European allies.  If it indeed wishes to prevent the European pillar from becoming 
a completely independent arm of security policy (something actually sought to 
some degree in the wake of founding the transatlantic security alliance in 
1948/498), then it will need to lessen the divide, assuming the future continues to 
hold no looming threat.     
Academically, this study intends to contribute to a further understanding of 
the limitations and benefits of using an ideational lens to analyze policy decisions 
regarding security operations.  The transatlantic security rift rarely is studied 
through a security culture lens. My thesis builds on previous work that analyzed 
national strategic cultures, and transfers some of these insights to the emerging 
collective European level of strategic culture.  It diverges from those works and 
others, though, by including a behavioral dimension, military operations, trying to 
assess the transatlantic security divide by comparing U.S. and EU operations 
since 2003.  The earliest of the ESDP operations (in Macedonia and Congo in 
2003) demonstrated an increasing EU willingness to launch its own operations.  
                                            
7 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 20. 
8 Thies, chap. 2; John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 5. 
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By including actual behavior, complemented by guiding documents and elite 
rhetoric, this thesis hopes to shed new light on the transatlantic security divide.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
Based on Farrell’s finding that a study of the causal relationship between 
ideational factors and policy behavior can produce fruitful results,9 this study will 
attempt a “structured, focused comparison”10 between the strategic cultures of 
the United States and the European Union in order to investigate more 
accurately the state of the current divide.  Similar to Meyer’s previously 
mentioned study on convergence, this analysis will study the state of divergence 
by comparing strategic cultures on either side of the Atlantic.  This work will also 
build on one of Meyer’s “surprise findings” that domestic political views were 
influential in shaping strategic culture and security decisions.11  Since the states 
under this study’s microscope are liberal western democracies whose governing 
elites can change from one election to the next, this study assumes that a given 
political party, when elected into office, may raise certain elements within a 
heterogeneous strategic culture to the forefront and downplay others.   
This study does not aspire to undertake the difficult task of discovering the 
causal pathway linking ideas and behavior, but instead focuses on how different 
motivations can be revealed through a controlled examination of guiding 
documents, elite speeches and behavioral choices, allowing cumulative findings 
derived from multiple sources.  Originally intended to explain why the Soviet 
nuclear strategy was different from U.S. nuclear strategy, first attempts at 
strategic culture analysis are today considered overly deterministic by some 
constructivists.12  However, this study borrows heavily from Colin Gray’s counter 
                                            
9 Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies,” 58.  
10 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 67.  
11 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences, 12.  
12 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 37. 
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to this critique: strategic culture is most valuable when used as an intervening 
variable that provides context and thereby helps understand behavior.  In his 
words: “above all else, strategic culture should be approached as the context that 
can provide understanding of what behavior means.”13  This study follows his 
advice and uses his critique of the constructivist approach as the lens through 
which to understand the different strategic cultures and provide a valuable 
assessment of their differences. 
Even with the afore-mentioned critiques of strategic culture, there still 
exists room within the theory to study and “observe the unobservable.”14  The 
‘unobservables’ in this context are the very attributes of strategic culture, which 
shape the policy decisions and behavioral choices of both nations and 
international organizations.  The challenge then lies in how one defines the 
strategic culture embodied by a state, which itself is a composite actor with many 
subcultures, or a conglomeration of states.  In its effort to base strategic culture 
on specific pieces of evidence, the focus here will be on guiding security strategy 
documents, elite speeches, and actual behavioral choices.  Behavioral choices in 
this context are the actual military operations undertaken by the U.S. and the 
European Union within the bounded timeframe.  In a departure from first and 
second generational studies of strategic culture which assumed a long historical 
context was a necessary determinant of strategic culture, this study borrows on 
Lantis’ argument that a significant event has the potential to set strategic cultures 
on a different path.15  It is supposed here that the system shock of 9/11, followed 
by the invasion of Iraq, was such an event for U.S. strategic culture. The initial 
ESDP operational choices provide an opportunity to look at the ideational 
differences guiding operational choices at this unique moment in time.  This is 
not meant to assert that operations are only understandable by analyzing the 
                                            
13 Ibid., 68. 
14 Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies,” 49–72. 
15 Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” Strategic Insights 
IV, no. 10 (October 2005): 8. 
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strategic cultures guiding them.  Strategic culture is used in this study as a way to 
compare the rationales guiding United States’ and European military operations.   
After a conceptual chapter on security culture, the empirical part of this 
study will focus on ESDP operations since 2003, and a comparable study of the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq. To date there have been more than 17 completed or 
ongoing operations under the authority of the EU.16 This study will look 
specifically at the EU operations conducted so far; they are not just military, but 
also include police and civilian interventions and will be referred to as activities, 
operations, or interventions.  It will look at these operations in the aggregate, thus 
trying to filter those overarching characteristics all of them share, in order to 
compare them afterwards with the invasion of Iraq.  Each of these pieces of 
evidence will be examined for specific indications of strategic culture in order to 
assess the current state of the ideational divide across the Atlantic.  Borrowing 
from Meyer’s rigorous assessment of the convergence of European national 
strategic cultures,17 this study will ask the following four questions in each of the 
case studies: 
1) What was the professed reason for intervention in another country? 
2) How much did the actors stress a need for international legitimacy, 
including UN Security Council authorization, before an operation was 
initiated? 
3) How important was multilateralism for the actors? And how did they 
understand multilateralism, specifically with regard to international 
organizations? 
4) How much did the actors rely on diplomacy before engaging with 
military forces? 
                                            
16 European Union.  European Security and Defense Policy Operations.  
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en, last accessed March 2008. 
17 Adapted from Meyer’s findings in Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, as 
well as Gray’s description that capturing strategic culture is about capturing the ideas and the 
behaviors that result from strategy decisions in Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context.” 
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Each of these questions has its own intricacies.  Applicable to three of 
them are the questions of whether or not the need for legitimacy, multilateralism, 
or exhausted diplomatic activity was considered an absolute prerequisite to the 
undertaken operations.  Is there evidence that those three factors were sought, 
but that the operations would have proceeded even if there was no progress in 
attaining those attributes?  Or, does the evidence support that the operation was 
in jeopardy of not proceeding based on the lack of one of those three 
preconditions?   The questions are also not binary, but instead offer a spectrum 
on which the answer may lie.  There may be cases where an attempt was made 
in terms of rhetoric, but in the end the operation proceeded without attaining the 
stated objective.  In the most favorable of circumstances, there will be a clear 
need for a certain precondition, without which the operation would have been 
cancelled.  However, since this study is limited to operations that have been 
undertaken, that evidence will only be visible in the rhetoric or debate prior to the 
operation.  Also, by limiting the study to operations that have been undertaken or 
are ongoing, this study looks at only the most important and universally accepted 
ideas to which actors are committed, by virtue of the fact that these operations 
receive a portion of the limited resources available to each entity. 
In measuring the divide, it is not enough to say that there is or is not a 
discernible divide.  Instead, this study seeks to characterize the divide based on 
each of the factors mentioned in the questions above.  The first comparison will 
concentrate on ideas as reflected in the security strategies. Content analysis is 
crucial here, looking at both similarities and differences.  This same information 
will be obtained from the speeches of the primary representatives, President 
Bush and EU High Representative Solana, as well as those others speaking for 
the respective entities.  Lastly, after analyzing the completed and ongoing 
operations, the conclusion will aim at determining which areas reveal the most 
agreement and which the most disagreement. I will finish by offering some 
specific policy recommendation on how to bridge those gaps. 
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D. EXPECTATIONS 
This thesis expects to find that the current neo-conservative ideational 
foundation of U.S. security operations is considerably diverging from the Kantian 
ideals expressed in NATO’s charter and, even more so, in the European security 
strategy.  It expects to find that the enlargement and diversity of the European 
Union has held it to operations that embody the ideal of highly legitimized, 
multilateral use of force as an act of last resort after extensive diplomatic effort.  If 
correct, this is indicative of very different strategic cultures on either side of the 
Atlantic that would pose significant barriers to future security cooperation.  
Without a significant shift in strategic culture on either side of the Atlantic, this 
would allow only joint operations in future based on those areas where both still 
overlap.  However, with the knowledge expected to be gained from this study, 
specific policy choices on the part of the EU or the U.S. could lead to a narrowing 
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following discussion intends to lay the theoretical foundation for how 
strategic culture is to be used in this analysis.  The first section explains why 
strategic culture was chosen as the analytical lens for this study.  By focusing on 
one elucidating debate, it explains why neither realism, nor institutional liberalism 
are appropriate to the task at hand.  The main section explores what has 
previously been written about strategic culture and some examples of how it has 
been used in earlier studies.  Specifically, it will detail what are considered to be 
the three generations of thought on strategic culture, including how strategic 
culture theorists argue is the best way for obtaining information about the 
strategic culture of a certain entity.  This section also acknowledges the 
theoretical limitations of strategic culture and how this study narrows its focus in 
order to minimize those challenges.  The concluding section re-captures the 
methodology of how to utilize the strategic culture approach in the ensuing case 
study comparisons.   
B. WHY THE USE OF STRATEGIC CULTURE? 
In a study published in 2004, Thomas Mowle asked a similar research 
question: “Why, despite their professed similarity of goals, do the policy 
preferences of the European Union (EU) and United States diverge on so many 
multilateral issues?”18  His answer, after a study of twenty different case studies 
ranging between environmental, arms control, human rights, and military 
cooperation issues resulted in a finding that American preferences are predicted 
better by realist theories, while European positions are “often consistent with 
                                            
18 Thomas S. Mowle, Allies at Odds?: The United States and the European Union (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1 (italics used by original author). 
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liberal institutional expectations, European behavior in the end also tends to be 
consistent with realist expectations.”19  These results beg the question of why, 
then, does this analysis use a comparative cultural approach when a previous 
comparison of U.S. and EU behavior found these actors’ behavior most aligned 
with realism’s expectations.  This study is fundamentally different by focusing on 
the simpler task of trying to flush out the ideational differences between these 
two actors, as opposed to involving itself in a causality argument.  Mowle’s 
analysis focused on which theory fit better to a wide range of topics between the 
U.S. and EU as the principle actors.  Another minor difference is the scope of this 
study.  It intends to study EU operations that mostly occurred after Mowle’s study 
was completed. 
In 1999, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik wrote a compelling article 
asking if anyone was still a realist.20  This single article elucidates many of the 
reasons why these other theories were not chosen for this study.  In that article, 
they pointed out realism’s three fundamental tenets: the primary actors are 
unitary states in an anarchical system; those states have competing interests, 
and ‘material capabilities’ are what matter most in pursuing those interests.21  
Legro and Moravcsik went on to recommend that for realist theory to maintain its 
theoretical soundness, its “claims should therefore be limited to circumstances in 
which states are motivated by strong and symmetrical underlying conflicts in 
preferences… or situations where the cost of coercion is so low that its cost-
effective use is feasible.”22  This analysis chose not to use realism because of its 
lack of focus on ideas and motivations, as explained by this article. 
 In the same article, Legro and Moravcsik argue that institutionalist theory 
“contains theories and explanations that stress the role of international 
                                            
19 Mowle, Allies at Odds?: The United States and the European Union, 147. 
20 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International 
Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), 5-55. 
21 Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist," 16-17. 
22 Ibid., 49. 
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institutions, norms, and information,”23 which would be helpful to this analysis if it 
were a comparison of two institutions such as NATO and the EU.  Haftendorn, 
Keohane, and Wallander’s “brand of institutionalism relies heavily on contractual 
theories in economics and on the rationality assumption,”24 which also looks 
more at the interaction of institutions and how that interaction affects institutional 
behavior.  Similarly, Thomas Risse-Kappen presents liberal institutionalism as a 
Kant-inspired “pacific federation,” or what he refers to, by borrowing from Karl 
Deutsch, as a “pluralistic security community.”25  Even though the present study 
is centrally focused on the EU as an institution, it is not focused specifically, as 
these three authors point out, on the insight provided by institutionalist theories 
as to the bargaining outcomes and processes specific to institutions.  Instead, 
this study’s focus is narrowly confined to a comparative analysis of why these 
two agencies (one a state and the other an international organization) are 
embarking on specific security-related operations, and so again, it focuses on 
strategic culture as the context used to understanding the differences between 
the ideas guiding the two respective entities. 
C. STRATEGIC CULTURE 
The concept of strategic culture traces its roots to the Cold War, and is 
generally broken down into three ‘generations’ of thought on the subject.26  First 
generation strategic culture literature, centering around Jack Snyder, generally 
focused its effort on explaining how Soviet culture caused the Soviet leadership 
to perceive information differently than the West, and how that different 
perception caused them to make strategic nuclear calculations that did not 
                                            
23 Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist," 10. 
24 Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander, Imperfect Unions: 
Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5. 
25 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 29-34. 
26 Gray, “Strategic Culture as context”; Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture”; Lantis, 
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necessarily conform to rational (and Western) realist expectations.27  Surveyors 
of the second generation of strategic culture, which is situated in the late 1980s 
around Colin Gray, agree less about that generation’s trends.  According to 
Johnston, these authors argued that decision-makers primarily use strategic 
culture arguments instrumentally to legitimize their policies.28  Lantis, however, 
singles out reference to historical foundations as the common theme among 
second generation theorists of strategic culture.29  What is common across both 
generations is the search for understanding the impact of ideational factors upon 
strategic decisions, as opposed to the more common realist considerations of the 
time, focusing on material capabilities, power, or threat.30 
There were multiple critiques of first and second-generation research of 
strategic culture, which helped form the ‘third generation’ of constructivist origin. 
These critiques are salient to the theoretical constructs of this analysis.  Johnston 
argued that first generation analysts were over-deterministic and because culture 
explained everything, it explained nothing.31  Following Gray’s response to this 
critique, that strategic culture is not easily confined to a falsifiable theory, this 
study does not adhere to Johnston’s more stringent requirement that strategic 
culture has to be falsifiable in order for it to be a viable social science theory.32  
This study uses, as his title recommends, strategic culture as an intervening 
variable that provides context and thereby increases the understanding of 
                                            
27 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, R-2154-AF 
(Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1977), 8 and Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism 
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981) as cited in Lantis, “ Strategic Culture,” 2-3; Gray, “Strategic 
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Howlett, and Stuart Poore ed.,  Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture (Aldershot, England: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2004): 8-9. 
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29 Colin Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of 
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observed behavior.  This analysis turns to strategic culture because it can 
provide the ideational context about policy choices and behavior that are 
conducive to a comparative analysis.  
The analysis now turns to some of the problems associated with the use 
of strategic culture as a theoretical basis.  One of the more important debates in 
the realm of strategic culture is the linkage between ideas and behavior.  In 
contrast to Gray’s assertion of the inclusion of both behavior and ideas within the 
conceptualization of strategic culture, Johnston says they must be separated by 
in order to use strategic culture as an independent variable that influences the 
dependent variable of behavior.33  Johnston says that strategic culture is “a 
system of symbols which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic 
preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in 
interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of 
factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”34  
Another scholar who separates culture from behavior is John Duffield who says 
that behavior is influenced by culture, but not a part of it.35  Like Johnston, he 
asserts that culture helps “define the basic goals,” “shapes perception of the 
external environment,” affects the potential behaviors and responses to events, 
and “strongly influences the evaluation of the seemingly available options and 
thus the choices that are made among them.”36  The problem with completely 
separating ideas from behavior is that ideas are unobservable.  Unless the 
researcher has a detailed survey from all of the elites of a given community, 
revealing their ‘attitudes and ideas’ that lead to certain security-related decisions, 
                                            
33 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 44, see footnote 25. 
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Neorealism,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 765-803. 
36 Ibid., 771-772.  
 18
there is no way to capture these “unobservables.”37 Without the ability to 
conclusively identify the ideas embedded in the strategic culture that produce 
specific behaviors, it is very difficult to prove causality by posing ideas as the 
independent variable. 
This analysis attempts to overcome this difficulty by taking two structural 
decisions.  First, it does not set out to accomplish the more rigorous task of 
proving causality.  As mentioned before, it uses strategic culture as an 
intervening variable that helps frame an understanding, in order to allow for a 
valid comparison, without tackling the more daunting task of posing an 
independent variable that causes the behavioral choices under review.  Second, 
by incorporating behavior as a piece of evidence, in addition to the guiding 
documents and rhetoric, the comparative study becomes more robust than a 
comparison that limits its evidence to only the discussion of ideas.  In addition to 
behavior, Farrel also cites “public statements and confidential papers of policy 
and political policy elites”, and public opinion polls, as a way to find tangible 
evidence of strategic culture.38  Johnston says that evidence of strategic culture 
could include “the writings, debates, thoughts and words of culture-bearing units 
such as strategists, military leaders and national security elites; weapons designs 
and deployments; war plans; images of war and peace portrayed in various 
media; military ceremonies; even war literature.”39  Meyer argues that “speeches, 
statements, and documents may well be expressions of strategic culture, but 
they should be analyzed systematically and ideally juxtaposed to other evidence 
such as public opinion polls, newspaper articles, oral evidence, or elite 
surveys.”40  These authors argue that strategic culture is a valid independent 
variable that can affect a dependent variable of policy choices.  It is not that this 
study disagrees with this argument, but instead has chosen a different way to 
                                            
37 Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” 
International Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2002) 49–72. 
38 Ibid., 60.  
39 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 49. 
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use strategic culture.  This study includes behavior, as Gray recommends, within 
its conception of strategic culture as a pragmatic way to develop a richer account 
of the context surrounding each political entity’s behavioral choices.  Given these 
recommendations, this analysis has settled on the use of governing documents, 
elite speeches, and specific operations as the evidence to be used in order to 
provide an indication of the two strategic cultures for comparative purposes.  By 
taking a snapshot in time, this study also brings to light the complex question of 
whether or not strategic culture is be considered a malleable or permanent 
construct. 
In addition to the debate about the inclusion of behavior into the definition 
of strategic culture, there is also a debate about a strategic culture’s 
permanence.  Johnson unequivocally argues that for an idea or norm to be 
considered a part of its strategic culture, then that construct must enjoy a degree 
of permanence.41  One must remember, however, that Johnston sets out to 
prove causality by marking strategic culture as an independent variable, and in 
order to strengthen the case for causality, he argues that strategic culture much 
be found over a long period of time in order for it to have a direct impact on 
behavior.  In this comparative analysis, which uses strategic culture as an 
intervening variable, this analysis sides more with the authors who argue that 
strategic culture can change over short periods of time, given certain 
circumstances.42 Jeffrey Lantis argues that “external shocks” may cause a 
significant change to strategic culture.43  In addition, he argues that certain 
norms within a community’s strategic culture coming into conflict with one 
another can also result in behavior that is not previously within the confines of a 
community’s strategic culture.  Even though the majority of scholars regard 
culture as persistent, changing though incrementally over time, sharp changes in 
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strategic culture seem to be possible, given circumstances, such as the catalytic 
event on September 11, 2001 (9/11) or the formation of a new transnational actor 
such as the EU’s CFSP and ESDP. 
In addition to the debate about the inclusion of behavior into the definition 
of strategic culture, there is also this debate about a strategic culture’s 
permanence.  Johnson unequivocally argues that for an idea or norm to be 
considered a part of its strategic culture, that construct must enjoy a degree of 
permanence.44  One must remember, however, that Johnston sets out to prove 
causality by marking strategic culture as an independent variable, and in order to 
strengthen the case for causality, he argues that strategic culture must be found 
over a long period of time in order for it to have a direct impact on behavior.  In 
this comparative analysis, which uses strategic culture as an intervening variable, 
and as a tool to provide a richer comparative analysis, it is accepted that system 
shocks can also change a strategic culture in a shorter period of time just as 
other changes take place over a longer period of time.45 Jeffrey Lantis is one 
such advocate who argues that “external shocks” may cause a significant change 
to strategic culture.46  In addition, he argues that a conflict among norms can 
also result in behavior that is not previously within the confines of a community’s 
strategic culture.  Even though the majority of scholars regard culture as 
persistent, changing though incrementally over time, sharp changes in strategic 
culture seem to be possible, given circumstances, such as the catalytic event on 
September 11, 2001.  By accepting this event as a critical juncture that greatly 
affected the strategic culture of the U.S., this study focuses on the predominant 
trends of the strategic culture that emerged after this event.  Speaking of the 
elements of a strategic culture that ‘rise to be the most visible’ brings to light the 
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fact that one political entity’s strategic culture may contain many diverse 
elements: the challenge of heterogeneity. 
The final problem this study’s approach must overcome is the widely held 
assumption of a “homogeneity of a society’s culture across time.”47  How much 
heterogeneity does a strategic culture allow to still speak of one culture? When 
this issue is raised to the level of an international organization, such as the EU, 
more diversity leads to an even more difficult assessment of what can be defined 
as strategic culture.48  Even in the assessment of one state, there are many 
components and trends within a strategic culture because any state is a 
composite actor with many subcultures.  Here is one other area where the 
inclusion of behavior in the definition of strategic culture helps elucidate which 
subculture has become predominant in certain phases.  In order to surmount 
these difficulties, this study confines its focus to minimize the problem’s 
relevance.  As to the American culture, this study is narrowly confined to the 
currently dominant U.S. strategic culture as reflected in the administration’s 
policy choice to affect regime change in Iraq.  While this case study does exclude 
other elements of American strategic culture, it serves as a marker from which to 
analyze this study’s limited purpose: an analysis of the state of the transatlantic 
security divide at one of its most critical moments.  In order to solve the 
heterogeneity problem encountered with an analysis of the strategic culture 
embodied by ESDP operations, this article employs a small meshed filter.  By 
only using evidence that was authorized by all EU member states, this study 
focuses only on the ideas and norms that are mutually agreeable to EU member  
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nations and therefore part of its collective strategic culture, despite the 
considerable differences between the national strategic cultures still persisting 
throughout Europe.49 
The final element of this study to discuss are the boundaries of European 
strategic culture.  As concerns content, I will restrict myself mainly to military 
operations; thus, the term strategic culture is here preferred over the more 
encompassing term security culture (put Howorth then in footnote). Jolyon 
Howorth mentions that he prefers the term “security culture” to “this cocktail that 
theoreticians and political scientists have called ‘strategic culture,” because he 
“thinks it is more neutral politically and because I believe it is more appropriate 
for whatever collective mindset is in fact taking shape in the EU.” 50  As concerns 
spatial boundaries, cultures always have cores and peripheries, where cultures 
fray out. Thus, boundaries are fluid and fuzzy.  And why not?  Theory can well 
take account of such a state of affairs and retain its validity and practicality.  This 
study focuses on the EU and the culture emerging within it. Such refers 
specifically to the transnational strategic culture that has emerged thus far within 
the confines of the EU, limiting its focus on the operations that have been 
conducted under the auspices of ESDP.  The study leaves open in how far other 
European countries outside the EU realm share the norms and ideas of the EU 
core. Instead, it concentrates on the norms and ideas that are reflected within the 
architecture of ESDP.  Each country that has a vote within the confines of ESDP 
contributes to this transnational strategic culture (or what shall also be referred to 
as EU security culture within this paper) by approving certain activities or 
disapproving others.  These debates and actions have launched a new collective 
actor into the field of security policy. 
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III. EUROPEAN CASE STUDY 
A. THE STATE OF CURRENT RESEARCH  
Against the backdrop of what exactly constitutes the broader topic of 
strategic culture in general are arguments about the specific current makeup of 
European and American strategic cultures.  This study sides with those who 
argue that a European strategic culture is indeed in the making and attempts to 
characterize what has emerged thus far.  Christopher Meyer, while not 
specifically talking about the transnational EU strategic culture, found 
convergence among national European strategic cultures on the legitimacy to 
use force for humanitarian purposes and the “acceptance of the EU as an 
appropriate framework for security and defense policy.”51  However, in contrast 
to his findings of convergence, he still finds areas of disagreement among 
European countries concerning alignment with United States, which is viewed as 
more likely to use “force to advance political and economic interests, or to use 
force abroad in high risk situations.”52  In conclusion, Meyer argues that a 
specific European strategic culture has emerged and exists based on a “relatively 
narrow basis in terms of norms and social cohesion, but supporting a model of a 
cautious Humanitarian Power Europe.”53 
Ian Manners agrees that although there is disagreement about the exact 
nature of the European strategic culture, it has emerged and is embodied in the 
2003 European Security Strategy (ESS).54  Adrian Hyde-Price finds many 
differences in the national strategic cultures of Europeans based on different 
experiences during the same formative period.  He argues that although the 
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experiences that were incorporated into each nation’s strategic culture were 
different, they all stem from the same formative events: World War II and the first 
years of the Cold War.55  Because of the shared formative period, he argues that 
the only commonality between national strategic cultures is based on the tenets 
that “war should be avoided at any cost,” and that armed forces should primarily 
be used for “deterrence and territorial defense.”56 
Cornish and Edwards disagree slightly with the notion that European 
Union strategic culture is quite so reluctant to use force and instead cite 
“preventive engagement”57 as a more appropriate way to define the strategic 
culture embodied in the European Security Strategy.  By ‘preventive 
engagement,’ they are not referring exclusively to the use of force, but also to the 
European Security Strategy’s emphasis on diplomacy and other tools at its 
disposal that can prevent humanitarian crises, especially in failed or failing 
states.58 
Each of these views of European strategic culture finds that a degree of 
strategic culture does exist at the collective level, distinct from the different 
national cultures.  Dissenters disagree that a strong European strategic culture 
can exist because of the inherent differences in national strategic cultures.59  In 
one such view, Sten Rynning argues that the European national strategic 
cultures are too diverse, and at best, can only produce coalitions of willing 
partners who happen to agree on individual security operations.60  Jolyon 
Howorth also points out that many realists “take it for granted that the EU, as an 
entity of 27 nation-states with different strategic cultures, has no chance 
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whatsoever of gradually forging a coherent and consensual strategic culture of its 
own.”61  This realist argument, though, slightly contradicts his statement that a 
European Union strategic culture has not yet emerged, but is in the process of 
emerging.62  Ultimately, this controversy is about the amount of homogeneity 
versus heterogeneity needed to talk of one culture, with a threshold almost 
impossible to set. The starting point of this study is that a collective European 
strategic culture has indeed emerged and is visible in the norms articulated by 
the European Security Strategy and ESDP operations, thus sharing the 
assumption that is increasingly gaining ground in studies on transnational 
European strategic culture. 
Jolyon Howorth cites Christopher Meyer and Bastian Giegerich as having 
produced the two most important arguments about European strategic culture.  
Both works’ findings bear elaboration to this study.63  After developing his 
definition of strategic culture that includes both ideas and behavior, Meyer 
surveys vast amounts of data in order to measure “normative change in different 
national settings as well as over time.”64  He chose to study the UK, France, 
Germany, and Poland.  He selected the first three because of their extensive 
economic resources and military capability and Poland because “it is the most 
outspoken of the newly acceded member states from Central and Eastern 
Europe.”65  He found that the national European strategic cultures were, in fact, 
converging, but not in every aspect regarding the use of force.66  He also found 
areas where convergence does not take place: in the level of cooperation with 
the U.S., “use of force to advance economic and political interests, or to use 
force abroad in high-risk situations.”67  He also cites as a “surprising finding” “the 
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extent to which attitudes to the use of force can vary within national societies 
across political affiliation, age, and between elites and the general public,”68 
which is simply an elaboration on the problem of heterogeneity within a given 
entity’s strategic culture.  Bastian Giegerich’s study, on the other hand, looks at 
the pressures of adaptation to national strategic cultures.  He finds that the 
“adaptation of those national cultures to an emerging European strategic culture 
was ‘gradual and limited but driven by constant interaction and the emergence of 
collective norms.”69  Also of relevance is his finding that “medium adaptation 
pressures” produce the most convergence with a European strategic culture.  On 
the other hand, when the European strategic culture differs greatly from the 
national strategic culture, the reaction is to revert to national strategic culture and 
“disengage from that element of European strategic culture.”70 
B. FORMATION OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 
In order to capture the essence of a transnational European strategic 
culture, I will now first give a very brief historical background of how the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) came into being.71  ESDP was 
borne from the St. Malo declaration formulated by the UK and France in 
December, 1998.  This declaration signified, among its most important attributes, 
the elimination of a long-held British resistance to a military force separate from 
NATO.  This had been one of the most significant barriers to the EU as a security 
actor for the previous decade,72 even though the French and British sought 
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ESDP for different reasons.  During this time, France had pushed for the EU to 
gain a security apparatus as a way to exert its own autonomy while lessening the 
importance of the U.S. in security affairs, while the British sought a capable 
European security apparatus as a way to maintain the Atlantic alliance.73  Once 
the British agreed that the EU needed “the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises,”74 ESDP was born.  
Howorth cites four reasons for the development of the ESDP that help frame an 
understanding of the European Security Strategy.  He cites “the lessening 
strategic importance of Europe for the U.S.,” which motivated the British to 
increase the European capability as a way to maintain the transatlantic ties 
through more European burden-sharing.75  The second and third reason Howorth 
articulates are closely related: the growing international willingness to intervene 
“in the internal affairs of sovereign states in order to safeguard human rights and 
right humanitarian wrongs” and the ensuing need to do so as demonstrated by 
the Kosovo tragedy.76  Lastly, Howorth argues that ESDP resulted from the EU’s 
internal motivation to be more than an economic actor.77  These same reasons 
eventually helped spawn the generation of a European Security Strategy. 
C. EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) was signed on December 12, 
2003.  Its opening statement speaks to a Europe that “has never been so 
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prosperous, so secure, nor so free.”78  The timing is important to note.  The ESS 
was released in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and after the U.S. National 
Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 had been released.79  After a comparison of 
these two documents, Berenskoetter concludes that the U.S. NSS is “more 
driven by idealistic or utopian thinking than its European counterpart,” which he 
argues is “a more ‘realistic’ approach to international security.”80 It is also 
important to note that the document was not drafted by the member states, but 
by Javier Solana at the direction of the European Union Council of Ministers, 
highlighting its transnational character.81   
In addition to these comments, a comparative analysis by Simon Duke 
brings out additional salients, especially about the difference between the ESS 
draft and the final version.  The first version had a reference to pre-emptive 
action, which was politically unpalatable after the pre-emptive invasion of Iraq 
and the NSS reliance on pre-emption.82   The final version also had a less 
definitive statement about the link between failed states and WMD compared to 
the earlier ESS draft, which Asle Toje claims was due to the U.S. inability to find 
WMD in Iraq.83  Toje also makes several critiques of the document elucidating 
what it is not.  He assesses that it is “primarily a tool to deepen European 
integration,” rather than “delivering an actual basis for EU security policy.”84  His 
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most strident criticism, however, is that it is “a recipe for ‘masterly inactivity’ 
where the EU seeks the moral high ground, aloof from international politics 
beyond speeches and majority decisions.”85  Despite these criticisms, the 
document is a rich piece of evidence for trends in European strategic culture. 
After an introduction, the document is broken down into three sections that 
cover “challenges and threats,” “strategic objectives,” and “policy implications.”86  
Speaking directly to a proposed European strategic culture in section three is the 
statement, “we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and 
when necessary, robust intervention.”87  This single statement, however, does 
not make a strategic culture; it evolves over years of experience and changes 
over time.  The entire document can be analyzed with regard to the four specific 
questions asked by this analysis in order to discover the strategic culture that has 
emerged within the framework of ESDP. 
As to the official arguments for EU intervention in other countries, the ESS 
argues that “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global 
security and in building a better world.”88  The second section of the ESS, which 
focuses on the perceived threats to European security, has only one specific 
sentence referring to European action when it says that “concerted European 
action is indispensable” to combating terrorism.  Other perceived threats besides 
terrorism that are envisioned as reasons for intervention are globalization, 
development, scarcity of natural resources, energy dependence, terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and 
organized crime.89  The ESS also devotes significant effort to an explanation of 
how each of these threats is interrelated and how mitigating one threat can help 
reduce another threat.  The ESS also stresses that it is in the interest of 
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European security that regions such as the Balkans, Middle East, and the 
Mediterranean are also secure.  The ESS suggests here that there are important 
geographical considerations factored into decision to intervene as well the 
threats previously mentioned. 
With regard to perceptions of legitimacy and authorization, especially by 
the UN Security Council, the ESS is quite specific.  It stresses the importance of 
“upholding international law” based on the “fundamental framework” of the United 
Nations Charter.  It also stresses the fact that the United Nations Security 
Council “has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.”90  This is in congruence with the most commonly accepted notions 
for the legitimate use of force: “the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense (article 51), and the UN Security Council’s authority to ‘take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace or security’ (article 42).”91  This section obviously stresses 
the importance of UN approval, but it is important to note that the ESS does not 
indicate that UN approval is necessary before the EU may undertake a specific 
operation, even though this may be a matter of semantics. 
 “Effective multilateralism” is the leitmotif of GASP and ESDP and is 
referred to extensively throughout the document.  It is difficult to quantitatively 
measure ‘importance’, but the fact that multilateralism is mentioned six times and 
in almost every section suggests that this norm is considered significant within 
the emerging European strategic culture.  The importance is also highlighted by 
the statement in the ESS that says the the EU needs “to work with others” if it is 
to “make a contribution that matches its potential.”92  This emphasis and 
importance should come as no surprise since the EU is an international 
organization.  In one of the many analyses of the ESS, Whitman states that  
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Effective multilateralism has become an overwhelming objective of 
the ESS.  It is the EU’s equivalent of the U.S. Cold War notion of 
containment as the key objective of the EU internationally.93  
As one of three major strategic objectives, the ESS sees multilateralism as 
a foundation for security in a globalized world.  The centerpiece of this section on 
multilateralism is the reference to the United Nations charter and the United 
Nations Security Council, both of which are mentioned in reference to 
international legitimacy.  The ESS also expresses high regard for international 
institutions of varying types, as key components of a multilateral world that 
derives stability from the rule of law.  These pieces of evidence, taken together, 
show that the ESS understands multilateralism in terms of close cooperation with 
other international organizations.   
There are some more detailed explanations of the ESS’s view of 
multilateralism that are not unpacked in the ESS, but this does not lessen the 
importance of this norm.  The ESS in summary stresses multilateral action as a 
fundamental tenet of its objectives and policies, but does so in vague terms 
without defining exactly what it means and without stipulating multilateral 
requirements that must be met before it acts. 
To what degree is the use of force a last resort?  The ESS does not touch 
on this topic specifically because of its emphasis on a comprehensive approach 
that encompasses all of the tools within the EU kit.  Its discussion of intervention 
refers not to the use of force, but to the use of diplomatic, civilian, and military 
intervention, as seen in its single sentence on strategic culture.  In this comment, 
the ESS states that it must develop a strategic culture that “fosters early, rapid, 
and when necessary, robust intervention.”94  While it talks about early 
intervention when necessary, this does not imply the early use of force, but the 
early intervention of the EU in a potential crisis with all of its available tools.  
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Lastly, the ESS speaks of “preventive engagement” as a way to “avoid more 
serious problems in the future.”95  As mentioned earlier, this was in contrast to 
the 2002 U.S. NSS and highlighted the EU strategic intent for trying to prevent 
problems with early intervention, but not an early use of force. 
D. SECURITY ELITE SPEECHES 
As many scholars of strategic culture have pointed out, a political entity’s 
elite speeches are a valuable tool in an attempt to capture and articulate the 
‘unobservable’ ideas associated with that entity’s strategic culture.  The most 
visible elite associated with ESDP operations is Javier Solana, the former 
Secretary General of NATO who is now the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary- General of the Council of the 
European Union,.  In the former role, HR Solana “assists the Council in foreign 
policy matters, through contributing to the formulation, preparation and 
implementation of European policy decisions”96, a role he is adeptly suited for 
with his reputation for promoting consensus, both as a figure in the Spanish 
opposition to Franco, the democratic consolidation of said country and later in 
Brussels at HQ NATO.  He acts on behalf of the European Council in conducting 
political dialogue with third parties.”97  In addition to a multitude of speeches by  
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Javier Solana, there are a lesser number of speeches by the EU CFSP 
Commissioners for External Relations98 from which to gather indications of the 
nascent European strategic culture..   
This study uses the evidence of these speeches since 2003 that speak 
directly to the research questions at hand.  The most helpful to this study are the 
remarks or summaries from meetings between high-level diplomats, remarks at 
the commencement or conclusion of specific operations, and reports to meetings 
of the EU defense ministers.  Not only do these speeches report to people who 
have control over national participation in ESDP activities, but these are also 
venues Solana or other figures can use to introduce new ideas.    The following 
sections make no attempt to capture every quote that pertains to each research 
question, but instead are an attempt to ascertain the broad themes that appear 
throughout the speeches and which help further the understanding of a 
transnational European strategic culture.99  Overall, the speeches by security 
elites affiliated with the European Union are extremely congruent, not only with 
each other, but also with the ESS, signaling a remarkable degree of homogeneity 
within the nascent European strategic culture.   
There are many indicators as to the ideational foundations for ESDP 
interventions strewn throughout EU security elites’ speeches.  One of the first 
trends to note is how these speeches are very closely aligned with the ESS’s 
reasons for intervention and how strong the normative tone is within these 
speeches.   The EU is frequently mentioned as a “force for good”100 in addition to 
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the general goals of intervention on behalf of “security and stability.”101   In a 
speech about the first civilian EU operation, the police mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Solana mentioned implementing the rule of law as a goal second 
only to a “peaceful and stable Bosnia and Herzegovina.”102  Later that year at a 
similar EU police mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYRoM), Solana again mentions that EUPOL PROXIMA is “aimed at 
strengthening the rule of law.”103  In an additional example of his normative tone 
in 2005, Solana uses words like a “vector of peace and democracy”,104 and the 
“promoter of stability and security,”105  Also of note, in terms of congruence with 
the ESS is how Solana says the EU will intervene as it combats terrorism.  
Focusing on the causes of terrorism, he notes that the EU needs “to tackle the 
underlying causes such as political alienation and radicalization.”106  
In addition to the reiteration of the strategic objectives that were 
mentioned in the ESS, there are a few examples of reasons for intervention 
introduced by security elites that are not found in the ESS.  Javier Solana’s 
rhetoric deviates slightly from previous patterns by mentioning “the notion of 
human security - which puts the security of individuals front and centre.”107  He 
mentions this security dimension as a potential area for future EU involvement as 
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globalization fosters a sense of “frustration and injustice.”108  In another notable 
deviation from the ESS, Aldo Ajello, the EU Special Representative for the Great 
Lakes Region, mentions deterrence as “the real contribution” of the ESDP force 
that had been committed with the EUFOR mission in Congo.109  In a January 9 
presentation to the United Nations Security Council, Javier Solana also referred 
to the ESDP’s ability to deter forces during its mission in Congo.  Deterrence is 
not mentioned in the ESS as an ideational reason behind the commitment of EU 
forces and Solana is not referring to deterrence as a reason to commit forces, but 
he and EUSR Ajello point out a valuable, proven capability that EU forces have 
demonstrated, and by doing so, avail deterrence as a tool available to the EU.  
Both human security and deterrence were not in the ESS, but have been 
mentioned by EU security elites. 
There are other EU representatives, whose speeches also reflect the 
leitmotifs of Solana’s speeches.  The head of the EU’s Aceh Monitoring Mission, 
Pieter Feith, specifically mentions that his monitoring mission was successful 
because it deployed a “broad range of instruments” in its “crisis management” 
mission and because the mission did “proactive monitoring”.110  Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, makes the same point 
twice during 2005 that the EU is a force for good, but highlights that regional 
interests are also at play by asserting that the EU must pay special attention to 
its own neighborhood.111 She thus emphasized a key point in the ESS – that the 
EU is especially interested in its own neighborhood. 
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Lastly, there are speeches that indicate a slightly more militaristic 
approach.  In a March, 2006 speech, Solana remarks that “of course we must be 
ready to conduct 'pure' military operations.”112  In a speech at the beginning of 
the following year, he alerts his listeners to his perceived future expectations that 
the EU will be called upon to perform “more missions and in more difficult 
situations.”113  While not a direct reference to a more militaristic intervention, his 
comments are an allusion to intervention in areas that would potentially be more 
violent and that would require a more military oriented intervention.  These 
comments about possible future ESDP activities point to potential scenarios 
where intervention would be more than what would be expected of a ‘Civilian 
power Europe.’ 
ESDP rhetoric has consistently stressed the same factors when it 
mentions international legitimacy.  Solana emphasizes legitimacy as a bedrock of 
ESDP activity, but stops short of mentioning UN Security Council authorization 
as a necessary requirement prior to EU intervention.  The forms of legitimacy 
mentioned throughout ESDP rhetoric are UN Security Council mandates and 
requests for EU intervention from either a specific country or a regional security 
organization. 
Examples of how the EU stresses the importance of international 
legitimacy can be found throughout any number of the many speeches given by 
Javier Solana.  A great example is a speech of Solana in July, 2003 when he 
mentioned the power international legitimacy lends to interventions,114 Even 
asserting that a legitimate action is destined for success.  He also argued that 
legitimacy is important because it creates “a lasting effect”115 when combined 
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with the use of force, whereas the use of force without perceived legitimacy 
entails “a wholesale return to the politics of the caveman, where the guy with the 
biggest stick carries the argument (until he turns the next corner)?”116  This 
evidence indicates that within ESDP, legitimate intervention is seen as a key to 
achieve long-lasting success. 
Solana mentions UN mandates for many ESDP operations, but also 
indicates that an invitation is another way to underscore an intervention’s 
legitimacy.  That invitation can come from the UN or a regional organization.  
Thus, the reason the EU sent a police force to Bosnia and Herzegovina was a 
request from the UN.117  During opening remarks of the EU police mission in 
FYRoM, Solana again stressed that the EU was there at the request of the 
Macedonian government.118  Another example is a speech on June 22, where 
Solana stressed that the EU was undertaking the Rule of Law mission in Iraq at 
the request of the Iraqi government.119  Each of these remarks underscores the 
legitimacy that is perceived to be derived from the request of an outside agent. 
None of the EU missions so far has taken place without an explicit invitation by 
the country concerned. 
Despite this great respect for legitimacy, Solana refrains from describing a 
UN mandate or an invitation as an absolute requirement.  One example of 
coming close to this definitive restriction is in reference to the need for a UN force 
to follow the EU ARTEMIS mission in Congo.  Of this need he cites a chapter VII 
UN charter mandate as an enabler for “robust rules of engagement,”120 but not 
as a requirement for legitimacy.  Another example where Solana was willing to 
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use the Dayton agreement as a source of legitimacy without stipulating that a UN 
mandate was necessary was his referral to EUFOR military action in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that would “exercise Dayton authority.”121  A UN mandate was 
expected, and received, prior to the EUFOR deployment,122 but this speech 
shows the willingness to point to sources of legitimacy other than the UN. 
The evidence above suggests that legitimacy is considered extremely 
important because of the power that it lends to an intervention.  That legitimacy 
can come from a UN mandate, and / or in the form an invitation to the EU to 
provide some form of assistance.  Even though it is considered extremely 
important, the evidence found in ESDP rhetoric does not support that a mandate 
from the UN or an invitation by the country concerned is absolutely necessary 
prior to intervention by the EU. 
An examination of the references to multilateralism in the elite speeches of 
the ESDP representative reveals two important areas of discussion that are 
pertinent to this study.  The first area focuses on the importance of 
multilateralism in ESDP operations, which includes references to why 
multilateralism is considered so important and how it is considered one of the 
foundations of ESDP activity.  The second area within the rhetoric helps frame 
how this important norm of multilateralism is put into action during ESDP 
operations.  Taken together, these two areas show that the principle of 
multilateralism is a fundamental component of European strategic culture. 
The importance attached to multilateralism in Javier Solana’s speeches 
cannot be over-emphasized.  In reference to multilateralism, Solana uses words 
such as “our best weapon against threats,”123 “essential to our success in these 
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areas,”124 and “sovereignty shared is sovereignty magnified.”125  In a slightly 
different context, again highlighting the importance of multilateralism by 
emphasizing its effectiveness, Solana states “threats are never more dangerous 
than when the international community is divided.”126  In 2007 further supports 
the reliance on multilateralism by stating that “it is often easier for us to act 
together than alone.”127 
In addition to the attributes of importance and effectiveness that are given 
to multilateral efforts, these elite speeches also indicate the type of 
multilateralism to which ESDP operations are connected.  These speeches 
regard multilateralism as a form of policy coordination through formal institutions 
requiring consent and approval of all the member states.  Solana says that 
achieving the EU’s foreign policy goals is only possible “with the active support of 
all member-states.”128  Also with respect to EU foreign policy, Solana says that 
“unanimity remains the rule.”129   
Besides unanimous consent, these speeches also view multilateralism as 
an inclusive concept whereby other non-EU countries can join in ESDP 
operations in order to strengthen those operations.  The multilateralism 
associated with the EU’s police mission in Bosnia was referred to as “voluntary 
and open.”130  In reference to the EU mission in Kosovo, Solana stated that “We 
are looking forward to the participation of non-EU NATO member states in the 
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ESDP mission.”131  The inclusive aspect of the EU consideration of 
multilateralism was also evident at the press conference announcing the end of 
the EU-led ACEH monitoring mission when the head of that mission, Pieter Feith, 
mentioned that “working closely together in an integrated mission with the 
ASEAN countries” was one of the highlights to be taken away from that EU 
mission.132 
The evidence within ESDP elite speeches appears to suggest certain 
trends associated with how the ESDP frames the concept of multilateralism.  
When multilateralism is mentioned, it is always mentioned as one of the most 
important concepts because it is perceived to increase the efficacy of ESDP 
activity.  Multilateralism is always directed towards international organizations or 
regimes, not perceived as an ad hoc mechanism of policy coordination. In the 
context of the CFSP, multilateralism is based on unanimous EU member state 
approval of the activity, not just approval of the most supportive countries – even 
though not all countries need to actively participate in those activities.  And lastly, 
the rhetoric stresses that ESDP multilateralism is open and inclusive because the 
contribution of other international organizations or non-EU states is perceived to 
strengthen ESDP activities. We do not, however, find any arguments criticizing 
the unilateralism of others or debating the drawbacks of multilateral endeavors. 
Answering the question of how exhausted diplomatic activity must become 
before the EU resorts to force is difficult given so few purely military operations.  
However, the EU strongly stresses conflict prevention, stressing a 
comprehensive approach employing all the tools at the EU’s disposal before a 
conflict turns into a crisis.  In light of this, Javier Solana iterates again and again 
that the EU must act early, but this does not mean by military force.  The 
intervention (whatever the kind) must be preventive and early to keep the crisis 
from exploding.   
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Examples abound of Solana speeches that proclaim proactive intervention 
better than reactive intervention.  In a 2003 speech addressing the transatlantic 
rift, he recommends that the U.S. and the EU “tackle causes and not just 
symptoms,”133 implying that coordinated, early intervention is a way to help mend 
the rift and also preclude the need to deal with a larger conflict.  Also, in 2003, 
Solana points out that the EU “must be ready to act before a crisis occurs,”134 
again suggesting that early diplomatic action will prevent the EU from becoming 
a bystander to the world’s conflicts.   
Two years later, more examples of ESDP rhetoric stress the same type of 
early response to a crisis as one of the key objectives of the EU.  At the 
beginning of 2005, Solana presented EU action as a stark contrast from previous 
world perceptions of EU behavior.  “There was a time when the EU’s foreign 
policy was criticized for being all talk and no action,” he admits, adding that 
“Europe needs to be more active and more capable – and that is exactly what we 
have become.”135  Later that year, in a speech in Paris, Solana reiterated his call 
for “rapid reaction and effective action.”136  In both of the commencement 
speeches for EU operations in Congo and Indonesia at the end of 2006, the 
capability for rapid reaction was mentioned as a key virtue by the respective 
ESDP leaders who touted the EU’s ability to intervene quickly and effectively, but 
not by force as a last resort.137 
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There is also some indication in the rhetoric that the EU would not refrain 
from a rapid military intervention if required.  This is not at the expense of 
diplomatic activity, but in addition to more diplomatic activity.  In early 2007, 
Solana argued that the EU’s “battlegroups capacity is at the heart of the EU’s 
ability to act quickly and robustly where needed.”138  In a similar vain, later that 
year, Solana reiterated that rapid reaction is an EU capability, but again added 
that that capability is available when the situation calls for rapid reaction.  In 
reference to potential Balkan instability, Solana reaffirms that the EU “will remain 
capable of responding immediately and robustly if required to intervene.”139  In 
these examples, Solana’s use of the word ‘robust’ reaffirms the EU commitment 
for a comprehensive approach that includes all the tools of intervention at the 
EU’s disposal, but the argument is not made that diplomatic activity must be 
exhausted before a military intervention may commence. 
E. ESDP OPERATIONS 
The most thorough and recent account of ESDP operations thus far 
comes from Howorth and this study makes great use of his work as the best 
secondary piece of evidence used to supplement the primary evidence available 
directly from ESDP sources.140  Howorth summarizes previous studies of ESDP 
operations by first pointing out the different theories under which they have been 
analyzed.  He also points out the different ways these operations can be 
grouped, which obviously depends on the theoretical approach that was chosen.  
The realist school, he points out, seeks to understand ESDP operations 
“holistically in the same way as a nation-state.”141  A second framework for 
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analysis separates EU activities into the types of foreign policy intervention 
(diplomatic, police, military, etc.), while a third school of thought focuses on 
institutional processes.142  Howorth summarizes these methods of categorizing 
ESDP activity based on objectives, geography (as done by the EU website), or 
his personal choice, functionality.143  The focus here is not recounting every 
detail of every operation, a task well beyond the scope of this text.  In this 
analysis, the narrow focus is on answering the four research questions about 
ideational foundation, legitimacy, multilateralism, and the use of force as a last 
resort.  Given the narrow focus, a brief summary of the operations is still 
required. 
All previous, current and projected ESDP operations are summarized in 
Table 1, which borrows heavily from Howorth’s own tabular depiction.144 In 
addition to the data from Howorth’s table, this study adds the ESDP activities that 
have taken place since his book was published in 2007.  The table first separates 
each ESDP activity between civilian and military types of operations.  The 
second column, operation category, details the type of mission that was 
accomplished.  The third column shows the names of the specific operations.  
The fourth column lists the duration of the operation by showing the beginning 
and ending date, or ‘present’ if the operation is still ongoing.  The fifth and sixth 
columns show where the operation took place and the number of personnel 
assigned to each operation. 
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Table 1.   ESDP Operations.145 
Type Operation 
Category 
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The most striking fact about “EU Operations”146 is the unexpected 
disparity between military and civilian operations.  There are 16 civilian activities 
                                            
145 Howorth, 211-212 provides the basis of this table, although this has been updated to 
include the operations that have commenced since the 2007 publication of his book. 
146 This is how The Council of the European Union refers to activities governed by ESDP on 
its website. 
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compared to only five military operations.  This contrasts with the amount of 
personnel devoted to each type of operation which has been decidedly more 
weighted to the military operations, with one exception that will be noted later.  
The plurality of civilian activities are police operations, of which there have been 
six, which is more than the total number of military operations.  These operations 
take the form of “monitoring, mentoring, advising and training.”147   
Both of the border control missions were at the request of the local 
authorities and were intended to raise the border control standards to a more 
professional level at each location.  The four missions that Howorth considers as 
military or technical assistance missions were more varied in their nature.  They 
ranged from security sector reform in the Congo (human rights and international 
humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, 
transparency and observance of the rule of law”148) to a combined military and 
civilian mission aiding the African Union’s AMIS II mission in Darfur.149  The 
civilian missions characterized by Howorth as peace monitoring or judicial 
training were / are just that.  The EU-Just missions are rule-of-law training 
missions, a technical term the EU uses to describe training given to those who 
work in the judicial system, while the Aceh mission in Indonesia was “designed to 
monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of 
Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)”150  The final civilian mission is 
                                            
147 These words or a combination of these words can be found on the EU’s website about 
each of the six police operations.  See Council of European Union website, EU Operations, 
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g, and select any of 
the police operations; last accessed March 2008. 
148 Council of European Union website, 
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=909&lang=en&mode=g, last accessed 
March 2008. 
149 Council of European Union website, available at 
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=956&lang=en&mode=g, last accessed 
March 2008.  The military portion is aiding African Union forces, especially with transportation and 
equipment, while the civilian portion is a police training mission. 
150 Council of European Union website,  
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=961&lang=en&mode=g, last accessed 
March 2008. 
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also the second most recent, but possibly the most controversial.  By far the most 
robust civilian mission in terms of personnel, EULEX Kosovo is in the build-up 
phase during the writing of this report.  The controversial nature of this mission 
will be dealt with in the subsequent answers to the research questions. 
The four military missions mentioned by Howorth and the most recent 
military mission (EUFOR TChad/RCA) have less diversity in their missions than 
the multitude of varied civilian missions.  The most significant operation in terms 
of financial and personnel resources is EUFOR Althea, a Berlin-plus151 military 
mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina that took over NATO’s Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) duties.  The only other military mission within the Europe’s geographical 
area was the first military mission, Concordia.  It was essentially the first test of 
ESDP’s military force and the first test of the Berlin-plus arrangement and it 
turned into a police mission once crime was determined to be the main threat.152  
Both of these military operations (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia) were 
operations that the EU took over from NATO.  The other three military missions 
have been in Africa and have demonstrated the EU’s willingness to increasingly 
engage militarily outside of Europe, even far away from the geographical 
boundaries of Europe.  Africa has become a focus of these operations. Those 
three missions are all considered ‘autonomous’ due to the fact that they did not 
use any of NATO’s assets.  EUFOR ARTEMIS (2003) in Congo, EUFOR RD 
Congo (2007), and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA in eastern Chad and the Central 
African Republic (2008) were or are related to humanitarian relief and crisis 
response.  ARTEMIS, the first EU mission deployed beyond Europe and without 
NATO’s help, had the limited objective of preventing civilian massacres in a 
single sub-state region (Bunia in the Ituri province of Congo).153  EUFOR RD 
                                            
151 Berlin-plus, in the most simple explanation is an agreement where the EU may be 
granted access to NATO resources.  For an excellent history and description of ‘Berlin-plus’ 
operations, see David Yost, NATO and International Organizations (NATO Defense College 
Forum Paper: Rome, 2007) Chapter 3. 
152 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 231-232. 
153 Howorth, 233. 
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Congo, similar to ARTEMIS, was designed to temporarily assist a UN force 
during the Congolese elections last year.  EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, the most recent 
of EU military actions, has specific objectives that include “protecting civilians,” 
facilitating “the delivery of humanitarian aid,” and the protection of UN personnel 
and material.154   
Given the multitude of operations, the difficulty in finding a concise way of 
identifying the ideational foundation of so many different types of operations is 
significant.  A characteristic that is relevant throughout each of the civilian 
operations is the intent to motivate good governance, whether in the areas of 
police, judicial, border control, or the security sector.  That intent, however, is 
what those operations do, but not necessarily the reason behind what is done.  
This is usually accomplished through advisory functions.  Raising the level of 
governance certainly aligns EU activity with the rhetoric and the ESS as a ‘force 
for good,’ even though there is an admitted vagueness to that term and it would 
be hard to imagine an intervention that was not viewed by its proponents as a 
‘good’ intervention. 
Both EU military operations in the Balkans took over from NATO forces.  
CONCORDIA’s aim was to “contribute further to a stable secure environment and 
to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement,”155 
which “deals with the political aspects of inter-ethnic relations in the country.”156  
ALTHEA, the other mission in the Balkans, continued the work of NATO’s 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR), whose ideational foundation is to help build “a 
                                            
154 The Council of the European Union, European Security and Defense Policy, EU 
operations, http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1366&lang=en&mode=g, last 
accessed March 2008. 
155 Council of European Union Website, EU Operations, FYROM CONCORDIA,  
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=594&lang=en&mode=g, last accessed 
March 2008. 
156 European Parliament Press Release, “Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia: progress towards EU (February 27, 2008), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/030-22177-056-02-09-903-
20080225IPR22123-25-02-2008-2008-false/default_en.htm, last accessed March 2008. 
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secure, self-sustaining and democratic country.”157  This operation, as the other 
three military operations conducted in Africa, are under UN Chapter VII, “action 
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression.”158  Those three missions were directly in support of UN missions 
and contain aspects of humanitarian assistance spelled out in the documents 
available from the EU.     
Lastly, the EULEX mission to Kosovo is entirely new.  It is the most robust 
civilian mission in a country that has recently declared independence, 
accompanied by much international controversy.  The EU’s stated goal in this 
recent operation is to “support, mentor, monitor, and advise the local authorities” 
in the Kosovar efforts to “build a sustainable and functional Rule of Law 
system.”159  What the website does not mention as it uses its technical term for a 
judicial training mission is that it will de facto take over from the UN mission 
(UNMIK)  that is administering all of the civil administration of a country which is 
still considered by some to be a sovereign part of Serbia.  UNMIK has been 
winding down since the last year, following the Ahtisaari Plan which the UN 
Secretary-General forwarded last year to the UNSC. 
The data is fairly clear with regard to the question of legitimacy and ESDP 
operations.  Up until EULEX Kosovo, there has been little controversy over the 
legitimacy of any EU operation.  Either a UNSC resolution was deemed 
necessary and then issued to cover an operation (especially the military ones), or 
in case this was deemed unnecessary (e.g. disaster relief) a UN action was not 
deemed necessary. All the missions, being non-coercive, followed a specific 
invitation of the host government,  This pattern has now changed with EULEX 
                                            
157 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, “EU Military Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Operation EUFOR – Althea)” (November 29, 2004), 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/041129%20Althea%20update%203.pdf, last 
accessed March 2008. 
158 UN.org website, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm, last 
accessed March 2008. 
159 Council of European Union Website, EU Operations, EULEX Kosovo, 
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1458&lang=en&mode=g, last accessed 
March 2008. 
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Kosovo.  Due to Kosovo’s controversial declaration of independence, considered 
by some (such as Russia) to be against international law,160 there is less 
apparent legitimacy for this operation than any previous ESDP activity.  Serbia 
contends that the UN Security Council is the only governing body that can 
legitimize an international body in Kosovo.161  The EU has chosen to keep the 
1999 UNSC Resolution 1244 as the legal basis for its EULEX Kosovo mission, 
as no new  UNSC resolution could be attained due to the Russian veto.  This 
operation has just begun as of the writing of this paper, so further conclusions 
would be premature, but this operation stands alone as the one ESDP activity 
with questionable legitimacy.   
The multilateral nature of the EU depends on whether one is speaking of 
internal or external aspects of multilateralism.  The EU as a transnational 
organization is internally multilateral with unanimous decisions required to 
conduct ESDP operations.  The decision-making process for ESDP operations is 
an example of what Ruggie defines as a “formal international organization” that 
acts in a multilateral way.162  This is based on his definition that “multilateral is an 
adjective that modifies the noun institution.”163  Ruggie states that an 
international organization (as opposed to an international regime) must have 
formalized “decision-making rules as voting or consensus procedures.”164  ESDP 
operations are certainly an example of Ruggie’s definitional requirement through 
the decision-making process, established by the various treaties that govern 
 
                                            
160 Russia and Serbia have most notably come out against this declaration, but other 
opposition comes from European Union states such as Spain, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia.  
See Nicholas Kulish and C.J. Chivers, “Kosovo is recognized but rebuked by others,” New York 
Times, February 28, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/europe/19kosovo.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin, last 
accessed March 2008. 
161 Balkan Insight.com, “Serbia Denounces Illegal Mission” (February 28, 2008), 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/8282/, last accessed March 2008. 
162 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution,” International 
Organization 46, no. 3. (Summer, 1992): 573. 
163 Ibid., 574. 
164 Ibid. 
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ESDP.  Other internal areas worth discussion under the guise of this conception 
of multilateralism are the processes that guide financial and troop contributions 
for the various ESDP activities. 
ESDP decision-making, although a complicated process based on various 
treaties that modify previously-signed treaties, sheds light on how ESDP 
activities meet Ruggie’s conception of multilateralism.  The most recent Treaty of 
Lisbon has been signed by all 27 members of the Union, but has yet to be ratified 
by the parliaments.  It is targeted for ratification by all member states so that it 
may go into effect by January 1, 2009.165 The Treaty of Lisbon would modify all 
previous treaties, the most recent of which was the Treaty of Nice, which entered 
into force on February 1, 2003.166  On matters that relate to CFSP, the Treaty of 
Nice stipulates that unanimous voting is required for ratification.167  The Treaty of 
Lisbon, if ratified and entered into force, retains the unanimity requirement for 
CFSP actions, but adds “permanent structured cooperation” as an additional 
avenue for ESDP activities.168  Permanent structured cooperation, an idea taken 
from the non-ratified European Constitution and practiced in other areas of EU 
activity (such as the Monetary Union or the Schengen Treaty), permits certain EU 
members who have attained a specific level of military capability to act, 
specifically to a request from the UN, by qualified majority voting instead of 
unanimous consent.169  Some view this as a way for the European Union to 
create a defense force where only the most militarily capable actors can commit 
forces, yet still retain the authority and legitimacy of the larger European 
                                            
165 European Union.  Europa website.  Treaty of Lisbon, 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/take/index_en.htm, last accessed March 2008. 
166 European Union.  Europa website.  Treaty of Nice, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm, last accessed March 2008. 
167 European Commission, A Guide for European Citizens (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2001): 9. 
168 European Union.  Europa website,  Treaty of Lisbon, 




Union.170  As of now, however, every activity authorized by ESDP has required 
the unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers, even though the financial 
burden is distributed disproportionately among the member states. 
Where military and defense related expenses are concerned, the EU has 
set up a funding mechanism known as Athena because military and defense-
related expenses are not permitted by the current treaties to be taken out of the 
CFSP budget.  Athena contributions are governed by treaty and paid for based 
on a formula that establishes a certain percentage for each country.171  The EU 
factsheet about Athena reveals that a disproportionate share of the financial 
resources for ESDP operations that are related to defense or military operations 
are shouldered by just four countries: Germany, France, the UK and Italy.  These 
four countries contribute a collective 70% toward the Gross National Income 
(GNI) scale that is used to divide ATHENA contributions among EU member 
states.172  ATHENA money is used to pay for the administrative or overhead 
costs of each operation, but other personnel and equipment-related costs are 
shared on a ‘costs lie where they fall’ basis, meaning each country is responsible 
for paying for its troops and the operations of its equipment.173  This 
disproportionate share among the members for the financial burden is also 
prevalent in personnel contributions. 
Personnel contributions among EU member states for different ESDP 
activities are on an ad hoc, state-preference based system.  Each state 
contributes troops on a voluntary basis, which in an unstructured way, creates 
                                            
170 EurActiv.com, “EU Treaty’s impact on defence policy remains unclear,” (February 13, 
2008), available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eu-treaty-impact-defence-policy-
remains-unclear/article-170256, last accessed March 2008. 
171 EU Council Secratariat Factsheet, “Financing of ESDP Operations” (June 2006), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Factsheet_Financing2.pdf, last accessed 
March 2008. 
172 EU Council Secratariat Factsheet, “Financing of ESDP Operations,” Annex.  The 
exception is Denmark,which has opted out of financing defense-related operations. 
173European Parliament note prepared for the SEDE meeting of January 26, 2006 on the 
financing of ESDP, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006noteonfinancing_/091
006noteonfinancing_en.pdf, 2, last accessed March 2008. 
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the same disproportionate burden-sharing outcome as the structured ATHENA 
system does for sharing the financial burden.  This system results in random 
contributions of troops to each operation based on the desires of the individual 
nation-states.  It also means that the composition of troops over time can change 
during a single operation.   
From an external standpoint, ESDP operations show a strong proclivity to 
act along with other willing partners such as the UN, African Union, Asean, or 
NATO under the Berlin-plus arrangement.  These coalitions with other willing 
partners are, in fact, coalitions of willing partners formed ad hoc for specific 
missions. 
ESDP strategic culture that has developed thus far reveals a strong desire 
for both internal and external multilateral activity.  However, ESDP activity is not 
guaranteed to be multilateral in practice because of a lack of multilateral 
enforcement procedures.  The financial mechanisms place a disproportionate 
share of the resource burden on a few countries, while personnel contributions 
are on a completely ad hoc basis, as are the alignments with other organizations.  
In addition, if the Treaty of Lisbon goes into force, then ESDP activity will become 
less multilateral due to the Treaty’s ‘permanent structured cooperation’ clause.  
The concept that diplomacy should be exhausted before a political entity 
resorts to the use of force is not entirely applicable to EU operations.174  The 
present analysis will only apply this question to the five175 military ESDP 
operations that have occurred thus far.  This contrasts with the earlier 
applications of this question in which strategy and speeches can speak to this 
issue in a rhetorical sense, because security elites can easily speak about how 
the EU’s comprehensive tools should be used before a crisis occurs.  They can 
also speak of the use of force as a last resort when they are speaking of strategy 
and potential interventions.  The question at hand does not fit well with non-
                                            
174 Based on Meyer’s study that found national European convergence on this topic. 
175 Includes information available about EUFOR TCHAD/RCA authorized by the EU on 
January 28, 2008. 
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military operations that did not involve the use of military force.  In each of the 
five military engagements, diplomacy was used prior to the dispatch of military 
forces, but only to the extent that the diplomacy resulted in an invitation for EU 
forces, such as was the case for CONCORDIA in Macedonia and the mission to 
RD CONGO.  Two of the military operations (including the nascent EUFOR 
TCHAD/RCA) were to support UN forces, and ALTHEA was a follow-up to 
NATO’s SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The trend thus far has been that four 
out of five military operations have been conducted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, indicating that the EU perceives the use of force as a UN-sanctioned 
response to a threat to peace.  ESDP military operations have not been used, as 
of yet, as an intervention tool where diplomacy was perceived to have failed and 
the EU needed to resort to force in order to accomplish its objectives. 
F. CONCLUSION 
A strategic culture has emerged and is still emerging for ESDP activity and 
is visible in its guiding document, elite speeches, and actual operations, be them 
civil or military.  On reasons for intervention, security, stability, rule of law, and 
humanitarian assistance are all reasons that are articulated in the ESS, many of 
Solana’s speeches and in the ESDP activities that have been undertaken.  
Although terrorism is mentioned in the ESS and frequently mentioned in Solana’s 
speeches, it has not yet been an articulated reason for an actual EU intervention.  
The multitude of civilian operations have at their heart better governance, while 
the military missions tend to be missions covered by Chapter VII of the UN 
charter.  And lastly, a comprehensive civilian and military approach to these 
interventions has firmly established itself within the strategic culture that has 
emerged from the EU as the preferred way for the EU to intervene throughout its 
nearby region and throughout the world. 
The need for legitimacy is also firmly rooted within EU strategic culture.  
Whether that legitimacy stems from a UNSC resolution or mandate or from an 
invitation to the EU, the EU stresses that it does not act without normative 
 54
sources of international legitimacy.  That legitimacy has been unquestioned 
except for the most recent EULEX Kosovo mission.  While the rhetoric and ESS 
stress legitimacy as ultimately important, they do not draw a hard line that puts 
the EU in an inflexible position that requires rule-based legitimacy.  This flexibility 
is now tested with the mission to Kosovo and it will serve as a distinct data point 
with regard to EU strategic culture and legitimacy.   
ESDP activity, rhetoric, and the ESS have also strongly ingrained the 
concept of multilateralism within the strategic culture that has emerged in ESDP 
behavior.  Multilateralism is understood both internally and externally.  Internally, 
a unanimous vote is required for action to be taken under ESDP guidelines.  
However, internal troop or financial contributions are at the discretion of the 
individual member countries.  Externally, the EU favors additional partners who 
are willing to join with the EU in an ad hoc coalition.  The potential for a lesser 
degree of internal multilateralism is present if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, 
opening the way for the proposed ‘permanent structured cooperation.’ 
Lastly, the EU’s strategic culture does not favor the use of force as a last 
resort.  The EU prefers early and proactive intervention across the wide spectrum 
of EU capabilities.  Neither the ESS, Solana’s speeches, nor the actual ESDP 
interventions indicate that using force as a last resort is something to which the 
EU aspires. 
Each of these areas indicate that a strategic culture has emerged and is 
visible in ESDP activity.  Also, as strategic culture theory suggests, the EU’s 
foreign policy version is also constantly evolving as it matures as an organization 
with each organizational experience and worldwide event.  This evolution is 
especially evident with examples like EULEX Kosovo and the proposed Lisbon 
Treaty which depart from the previous EU experiences in the areas of legitimacy 
and multilateralism.  The evidence also suggests that this evolution will be slow 
and the changes that have been witnessed thus far conform to Giegerich’s 
findings that adaptation pressures on national strategic cultures, when applied 
slowly, can result in strategic culture shift.  However, when these adaptation 
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pressures are applied too quickly or forcefully, they do not result in change, but in 
rejection of the pressure to change.  If this finding remains true to adaptation 
pressures on the strategic culture of ESDP activity, then students of the EU can 
expect to see gradual change over time, that could suffer setbacks if the change 
that is sought by some of its members is too great or too sudden. 
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IV. AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 
A. MAJOR FINDINGS ON AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 
American strategic culture is less heterogeneous simply because it is 
embedded within one nation-state.  This fact does not mean complete unanimity, 
however, as heterogeneity is still found within the debate over policy choices in a 
single nation just as it is in a transnational organization.  Such a variety of views 
has a long tradition in the U.S., reaching back to the 18th century.  Also, whereas 
the emergence of a European strategic culture is a relatively new topic based on 
the formation of CFSP and ESDP, American strategic culture has a much longer 
history from which to draw its composition,176 even if one argues that European 
strategic culture began before the formalization of EU security policies.  This 
study, however, confines its scope of analysis to the fabric of American strategic 
culture as it is reflected in the decision to invade Iraq.177  Based on Lantis’ 
argument of a system shock that provides the impetus for a possible change in 
strategic culture, this study argues that the New York City terrorist attacks were 
such a system shock that brought certain elements already in American strategic 
culture to the forefront of American strategic culture. 
In 1996, Peter Katzenstein argued that “American politics shows a deep 
division between a Congress committed to unilateralism and an executive 
                                            
176 For excellent readings on this topic, see Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: power, 
culture, and change in American grand strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 
Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (New York: Greenwood, 1968), Christopher 
Layne, The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), or Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United 
States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington , IN: Indiana University Press, 1973). 
177 For other accounts of this decision, not focused on American strategic culture, see 
Stephen J. Hartnett and Laura A. Stengrim, Globalization and empire: the U.S. invasion of Iraq, 
free markets, and the twilight of democracy (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 
Robert Kagan, “America’s crisis of legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 65-
87, and Rick Fawn, The Iraq war: causes and consequences (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006). 
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favoring multilateralism.”178 This period saw a Democratic President at the same 
time facing a Republican majority in Congress. It demonstrated how American 
strategic culture was broken up along party lines.  Jeffrey Lantis’ account of 
American strategic culture is exceedingly relevant to the study at hand.  He 
describes it as consisting of three main tenets: “American dominance in 
international affairs, with priority consideration of homeland security,” “a doctrine 
of preemption that includes a willingness to use military force to achieve security 
objectives,” and “a preference for unilateral action to reduce external constraints 
on American behavior.”179  Meyer also professes agreement with at least one of 
Lantis’ tenets by asserting that a high degree of international legitimacy is not 
regarded a fundamental tenet of the present American strategic culture when 
compared to European national strategic cultures.180   
Another recent evaluation places current U.S. strategic choices firmly 
within the historical context of what Colin Dueck calls the two most prevalent 
themes in American strategic culture.  He argues that “classical liberal 
assumptions” and “intense preference for limited liability in strategic affairs” are 
“two dominant and persistent features of [American] traditional strategic 
culture.”181  He argues that this tendency toward liberalism spawns the “desire to 
see democratic values and systems of government spread overseas,” either by 
force or by example.182  The other strong component, the “assumption of limited 
liability,” he defines “as a culturally shaped preference for avoiding costs and 
commitments in grand strategy, to an extent that is actually inconsistent with 
                                            
178 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World,” in 
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 
530. 
179 Jeffrey S. Lantis, “American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda,” 
European Security, 13, no. 4 (2004): 368. 
180 Christopher Meyer, “Theorizing European Strategic Culture: Between Convergence and 
the Persistence of National Diversity,” Center for European Policy Studies Working Document No. 
204 (June 2004): 5, available at www.ceps.be.  
181 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: power, culture, and change in American grand 
strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006): 21. 
182 Ibid., 23. 
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stated and established international goals.”183  In his argument, he also theorizes 
cultural change whereby adjustment takes place in reaction to “international 
conditions,” “the dominant strategic culture of the period,” “domestic politics,” and 
the current “political leadership,” which all combine to affect America’s “strategic 
adjustment,” or how its dominant foreign policy changes over time.184  His insight 
is a helpful to understand how American strategic culture has changed based on 
the system shock of 9/11, and what kind of strategic culture is reflected in the 
decision to invade Iraq. 
This section seeks to understand the American strategic culture, not over 
the entire history of the United States (a task that exceeds the limits of this 
study), but at the moment in time when the decision was made to invade Iraq.  
By asking the same four questions that were asked in the previous section, this 
study seeks to garner evidence of U.S. strategic culture from the guiding National 
Security Strategy, elite speeches, and actual intervention in Iraq so that a 
focused, structured comparison can be made between the two strategic cultures.   
B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 was drafted 
shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and can be considered the overall 
guiding document of U.S. strategic behavior when the decision was made to 
invade Iraq.  It has since been replaced by a new version that was signed and 
released in 2006, but an analysis of the changes between the two documents is 
beyond the scope of this study which only seeks to understand the cleavage 
between the European and the American strategic culture in 2003. 
Unlike the ESS, which was noted as somewhat of a response to the U.S. 
NSS of 2002 and which was the first document of its kind, the NSS, as a 
document, harkens back to George Kennan’s call for a strategy of containment 
                                            
183 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: power, culture, and change in American grand 
strategy., 26. 
184 Ibid., 33-36. 
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which was contained in his Mr. X article.185 Since 1986, each President of the 
United States has issued his version of a National Security Strategy. Bush’s NSS 
of 2002 was a proclamation of how the U.S. intended to face the world in the 
wake of the cataclysmic terrorist attacks the previous fall.  Many authors have 
written extensively about the document186 and there exists a consensus that 
describes the document as almost Wilsonian in its idealist thrust.  Dannreuther 
and Peterson ascribe the term “revolutionary” to both it and the ESS in their 
attempt to “change the world in essentially their own images.”187  Colin Dueck 
asserts that the document was a collection of “American classical liberal values… 
described… as ‘nonnegotiable demands.”188 
One of the most controversial pieces of this document is its justification of, 
and intended reliance on, preemptive action.  As Dueck points out, “preventive 
wars are not unknown in American history, but by any standard, to openly 
embrace the concept of preventive military action as a centerpiece of U.S. grand 
strategy was a remarkably bold departure.”189  While the executive branch’s 
National Security Council is responsible for the publication of the NSS, it was a 
matter of domestic politics for Bush to gain support from Congress in order to act 
upon said document.   
Bush made speeches throughout 2002 that introduced the ideas of the 
forthcoming NSS and painted a threatening picture that if the U.S. did not act, 
terrorists in conjunction with weapons of mass destruction would continue to 
threaten the U.S. until it acted to defeat these threats.190  The attempt to radically 
change the foreign policy parameters is reminiscent of a similar period in history.  
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After the cataclysmic event of World War I, President Wilson proposed and 
obtained allied approval for a supranational body after World War I after making 
significant political concessions of his own.191  But where Wilson failed in his 
attempt to attain domestic political support for his League of Nations proposal, 
Bush was able to gain domestic support for the use of force against Iraq from the 
U.S. Congress,192 and thus garner implicit approval for the implementation of the 
2002 NSS.  Similar to Lantis’ argument of a system shock, Dueck calls this 
change a “strategic adjustment,”193 a process whereby U.S. grand strategy did 
change because “window of opportunity” opened that allowed a specific strategic 
“subculture” to become the predominant thread in the national strategic 
culture.194  It is within this context that U.S. NSS of 2002 is best understood. 
The NSS is quite specific about the stakes for which the U.S. intends to 
intervene.  These stakes can be broken down into two categories: the ideals the 
U.S. aspires to propagate, and the intended areas of this propagation.  In the 
opening prologue, President Bush cites “defending the peace” and working “to 
bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every 
corner of the world,”195 as ideals worth U.S. intervention, even though not 
necessarily in a military sense.  Another ideational foundation for intervention 
mentioned twice in the document is promoting “a balance of power that favors 
freedom.”196  In addition to the ideational reasons for intervention are the specific 
targets of that intervention.  These targets are flushed out into two categories, 
both of which are also mentioned in the prologue.  The NSS envisions 
intervention against “terrorists and tyrants” and against any enemy that is 
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“seeking weapons of mass destruction.”197  These two perceived enemies are 
mentioned again in later sections, as tyrants are replaced by “rogue states,” 
especially those which are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 198  
These first pieces of evidence of U.S. strategic culture indicate U.S. intervention 
based on behalf of liberal ideals of spreading democracy and peace and directed 
specifically against terrorists or rogue states attempting to employ weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). 
There is no mention of United Nations approval in the NSS as an avenue 
to obtain legitimacy.  Instead, the NSS indirectly bases its legitimacy for the use 
of force on what is known in theoretical terms as just war theory, one of whose 
major tenets is “just cause.”199 Just war theory justifies the use of force by an 
adherence to accepted norms associated with the decision to use force and the 
method in which that force is used.200  Some examples of these norms include 
proportionality, minimized collateral damage, and the unacceptability of civilian 
casualties, which are also embedded in the law of armed conflict.201  Moreover, 
the ethical way to justify the use of force instead of the alternate justification 
based on international law202 negates the UN as an assumed or sought-after 
source of legitimacy for U.S. intervention.  In summary, the NSS’s final sentence 
in the chapter entitled ‘prevent our enemies from threatening us, our Allies, and 
our friends with weapons of mass destruction’ neatly articulates how the U.S. 
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views the legitimacy of unilateral action by claiming “the reasons for our actions 
will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.”203 
The most supportive statement in the U.S. NSS of multilateral activity 
states that “there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can 
accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends 
in Canada and Europe.”204  This statement, however, differs from the tone of the 
remainder of the document, which is more along the lines of an expectation of 
and attempt to undertake multilateral activities, but not reliance upon 
multilateralism.  For example, in section three, entitled ‘strengthen alliances to 
defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends,’ 
the NSS states that the U.S. “will continue to encourage our regional partners to 
take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists,” and then later that the 
U.S. “will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism.”205  
At the end of the section on strengthening alliances comes one of the more 
deferential statements toward multilateral activity.  In it, the U.S. acknowledges 
that it needs assistance “to defeat terrorism in today’s globalized world.”206  
Another section that stresses multilateral activity is chapter four entitled “working 
with others to diffuse regional conflicts.”207  This section’s tone is similar to the 
previous quotes stressing cooperation as an avenue to success in regional 
conflicts just as the previous section stresses cooperation against terrorism.  The 
next chapter on countering WMD also looks to further U.S. interests by taking 
“full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships 
with former adversaries,”208 and other examples of multilateral behavior.  The 
underlying tone here is one that recurs throughout the NSS; the U.S. wishes to 
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make use of its friends and allies to increase its leverage in security affairs and 
acts multilaterally only insofar as partners act in line with U.S. national interests. 
In addition to these statements there are references to “mission-based 
coalitions.”209  These coalitions are viewed, in the prologue, as a way to 
“augment… permanent institutions” (referring to international organizations such 
as the UN, OAS, NATO and WTO). 210  This type of multilateral activity seeks ad 
hoc arrangements in order to achieve emergent U.S. strategic objectives that 
have been laid out for a specific intervention.  In the chapter specifically devoted 
to “cooperative action,”211 the opening sentence refers to the U.S. strategy to 
organize coalitions “of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that 
favors freedom.”212  When other states are not willing to assist the U.S. in 
meeting its strategic objectives, the NSS states that the U.S. “will be prepared to 
act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require”213 unilateral 
action.   
Overall multilateralism, as viewed by the U.S. NSS, does not fit well with 
Ruggie’s analysis defining multilateral as an adjective that describes institutional 
behavior.214  Instead it is articulated along a spectrum that ranges from the 
willingness to act unilaterally, to an admission that unilateral action does not lead 
to the lasting achievement of intended objectives.215  Along this spectrum, the 
pragmatic implication is that ad hoc coalitions are acceptable and sometimes 
preferred to the other end of the spectrum: cooperation through institutions, 
although this end is stated as the ideal way to attain lasting objectives.. 
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The U.S. NSS makes extensive reference to the use of diplomacy, but 
does not stress that diplomacy must be exhausted before military action can be 
taken.  The most relevant piece of evidence in this respect is in the prologue 
where the President states “the only path to peace and security is the path of 
action.,”216  This is an ambiguous term, but is taken to ultimately mean military 
action because of the specific circumstances that have already been discussed 
in which this document was written.   Other references to diplomacy throughout 
the document simply mention that diplomacy is one of the tools within the arsenal 
of the U.S. strategic activity.  Diplomacy is mentioned to help prevent the spread 
of WMD, as well as “at the front line of complex negotiations, civil wars, and other 
humanitarian catastrophes.”217  In summary, diplomacy is highlighted as a tool, 
but it is not stressed that diplomacy should be exhausted before the U.S. 
commits its military forces. 
C. SECURITY ELITE SPEECHES 
There are many speeches made by multiple representatives of the U.S. 
government that explain the intervention in Iraq.  This study will focus only on 
those speeches that give direct evidence about the four research questions 
posed by this study as they pertain to the intervention in Iraq.218   
There are many speeches to choose from in order to assess the reasons 
for U.S. intervention in Iraq and, more importantly, to see the evolution of those 
reasons over time.  In September 2002, during his speech to the UN, the 
President lists several reasons for Iraq to remain at peace.  The first reason 
mentioned was Iraqi possession of WMD and the second reason was Iraqi 
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support of terrorism.219  Other reasons were mentioned, but they were of a 
smaller scale, such as internal Iraqi minority rights.  In October 2002, the 
proclaimed motivation was to deny WMD to Saddam and affect regime 
change.220  Later, during the President’s 2003 State of the Union address, the 
President stated, “if Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our 
people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him,”221 
again signaling WMD as the primary reason for intervention.  And finally, in the 
speech announcing the commencement of military action, President Bush used 
similar words, saying that the American military and its coalition partners were in 
Iraq so as not to “live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace 
with weapons of mass destruction.”222  Over time, presidential speeches before 
the invasion outlining the motivation for intervention moved from WMD and 
support of terrorism to WMD and regime change and then finally to the primary 
reason of eliminating WMD from Iraqi possession, especially to prevent them 
from falling into the hands of terrorists.  This finding corresponds with Dueck’s 
assessment that an essential element of U.S. strategic culture is its liberal 
thrust.223  U.S. intervention in Iraq, according to the rhetoric, is based on a desire 
to safeguard peace through preventive war and the elimination of WMD.  
Although the articulated reasons for intervention may have changed after WMD 
were not found in Iraq, this study considers the rhetoric before the intervention as 
a more valid indication of strategic culture than rhetoric that may have changed in 
order to save face. 
On September 12, 2002, President Bush delivered a speech at the UN 
calling for the UN to enforce its resolutions and hold Iraq accountable for its 
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actions.  This speech is a telling indicator of the way in which the U.S. viewed 
international legitimacy in the period preceding the intervention in Iraq.  This 
speech makes use of both theoretical principles of international legitimacy, 
ethical and rule-based, in calling for action against Iraq.  The ethical reasons are 
used to justify U.S. and international intervention based on the assertion that the 
Iraqi regime presents a danger to the security of the world because, as President 
Bush said, “the just demands of peace and security will be met.”224   The rule-
based legitimacy is asserted in two ways.  The President asserted that action 
must be taken against Iraq because of its continued violation of UN resolutions.  
He also asserted that Iraqi defiance of UN resolutions weakens the UN’s 
effectiveness and to prevent this loss of efficacy, the “partnership of nations can 
meet the test before us, by making clear what we now expect of the Iraqi 
regime.”225  The test he refers to is the continued Iraqi defiance of UN resolutions 
and whether the UN would act to enforce its own resolutions.  His speech 
indicated that the U.S. would act and hoped to get UN backing, but the lack of 
UN backing would be considered to be more of a failure for the UN than a loss of 
legitimacy to the U.S. operation.226  This speech ultimately indicated that the U.S. 
constructed ethical and rule-based legitimacy as potentially conflicting, with the 
former taking priority, the latter being secondary. 
Another example of the pursuit of international legitimacy made by the 
U.S. government is Colin Powell’s speech at the UN Security Council outlining 
intelligence information on Iraqi activities.  At the end of that speech, the case for 
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legitimacy was rule-based but the emphasis was not that UN resolution 1441227 
compels action in Iraq.  Instead, he emphasized that UN members “have an 
obligation to this body [UN as an institution] to see that our resolutions are 
complied with.”228  The difference is subtle, but important.  He does not 
emphasize that the resolution legitimizes action as much as he emphasizes that 
no action erodes UN legitimacy, again emphasizing ethical legitimacy over rule-
based legitimacy.  
The speeches leading up to the Iraqi invasion do not support an 
institutional definition of multilateralism, but instead support multilateralism as a 
concept of multiple countries acting together.  President Bush utilized the now 
infamous phrase, “coalition of the willing” to describe how the U.S. viewed 
multilateralism in the context of the intervention in Iraq.229  During his subsequent 
State of the Union address, President Bush reiterated the U.S. perspective on 
multilateralism: 
We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam 
Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for 
the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.230 
Another speech by Secretary Rumsfeld also provides excellent insight as to the 
reason behind this view of multilateralism.  In January 2002 at the National 
Defense University, in a speech to the U.S. military’s future leaders, Rumsfeld 
explained that  
Wars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be sure.  But they 
should not be fought by committee.  The mission must determine 
the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission.  If it 
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does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common 
denominator, and we can’t afford that.231 
Each of these speeches (and too many more to cite) explain the often-
analyzed U.S. view of multilateralism during the Iraq intervention as a coalition of 
countries willing to cooperate on a given mission.  Instead of an adjective used to 
describe institutional behavior, it is viewed in terms of flexible mechanisms 
established ad hoc to achieve a common, temporary goal. 
Speeches in the run-up to the intervention in Iraq indicate an extensive 
need for diplomacy and the resort to force as an option of last resort, although 
this view was challenged by other international actors.  In President Bush’s 
November 2002 speech to the UN, Bush places potential intervention in Iraq in 
the context of UNSC resolutions that date back to 1991.232  In the State of the 
Union speech prior to Iraqi Freedom, Bush reiterates that the context for the use 
of force is based on twelve years of Iraqi non-compliance with international 
demands.233  At a speech after the UNSC adoption of resolution 1441, Bush 
again mentioned Iraq’s non-compliance with previous UN resolutions.234  Each of 
these speeches assert that the use of force in Iraq is seen as an intervention at 
the end of a long attempt at diplomacy covering the previous twelve years.   
This rhetoric, however, opened the U.S. up to extensive criticism, which it 
received from many European countries.  Even though Bush portrayed America 
as exceedingly patient for having waited over a decade before intervening, the 
head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, testified that his organization expected 
“in the near future to provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough 
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assessment of Iraq’s nuclear-related activities.”235  So, while some European 
countries, most notably the United Kingdom agreed with the Bush position that 
diplomacy had run its course, others led by France and Germany argued that the 
weapons inspectors already in Iraq should get the time they asked for to finish 
their job.236  Thus, the Europeans-American dissent clearly signaled that the 
Europeans were willing to wait longer than the U.S. before employing military 
means, although the U.S. portrayed the Iraqi intervention as a last resort to the 
use of force. 
D. INTERVENTION IN IRAQ 
In many cases, there is little difference between the answers to the 
research questions about the specific operation in Iraq and the answers to the 
research questions about the rhetoric prior to the operation in Iraq, which was 
presented in the previous section.  In order to minimize repetition, the answers to 
the questions in this section will only present significant deviations from the 
previous section or, when appropriate, acknowledge agreement with the themes 
previously presented.   
The official reason for intervention in Iraq was no different in the night of 
the beginning of hostilities than it was in the period prior to the military operation.  
President Bush, in a succinct speech on the night hostilities began, offered that 
coalition forces were in Iraq because “the United States and our friends and allies 
will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with 
weapons of mass murder.”237  Dueck argues that the stated objective (referring 
to the outlaw regime and implied ensuing spread of democracy) is an example of 
the “classical liberal ideas in American grand strategy.”238  This characterization, 
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however, ignores the other portion of Bush’s stated objective about the threat of 
WMD, a characterization that Colin Powell “convinced the President, along with 
the rest of the cabinet” to use as an additional justification, in order to attain 
“some measure of international legitimacy.”239  Dueck’s characterization also 
ignores the originally stated objective of regime change, which faded to a 
secondary objective due to Powell’s ambition to increase legitimacy. 
The evidence presented thus far illustrates that the U.S. went to extensive 
lengths to obtain international legitimacy.  President Bush’s September 2002 
speech and Colin Powell’s February 2003 speech were aimed at convincing the 
international community to support intervention in Iraq, but they did not stress 
that international support was necessary before the operation could proceed.  
The U.S. did seek an additional UN resolution, but was blocked by the potential 
of a French veto.240  During these speeches, they stressed that the international 
community needed to support the operation because of the ethical legitimacy of 
intervening against an actor who presented a threat to peace through the 
attainment and proliferation of WMD.  They also stressed that inaction would 
erode the authority of the UN, resigning it to a meaningless organization in the 
face of continued defiance. However, in the end the Bush administration was 
willing to override any UN Security Council veto, including calls for moderation by 
allies such as France and Germany, the former of which was not able to block 
U.S. intervention with recourse to its Security Council veto power. 
The view toward multilateralism also did not change between the 
speeches previously examined and the actual operation.  In terms of multilateral 
UN action, the case has already been presented that the U.S. administration 
argued for international support, but was willing to act alone if it deemed 
necessary.  Multilateralism was seen as a tool of providing coalition partners, and 
not as a prerequisite before the U.S. could proceed with military action.  
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The speeches previously presented also provide the same evidence as 
the actual operation.  The U.S. argued that military intervention in Iraq was the 
final step after over a decade of failed diplomacy.  Its also argued that continued 
unsuccessful diplomacy meant that diplomacy had become irrelevant because of 
its inability to obtain pivotal national objectives. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Before summarizing the findings of this study, it is most important to 
reiterate that the conclusion presented here about American strategic culture are 
not intended to be all-inclusive.  Instead, the intent is to provide a glimpse of the 
elements of American strategic culture that were most prevalent in the decision 
to invade Iraq.  These elements of strategic culture emerged as guiding 
principles from the system shock of September 11 and, as Gray argues, provided 
the cultural context for help in understanding the behavioral decisions. 
The ideational foundations for U.S. intervention prevalent in its strategic 
culture are liberal in nature.  Dueck refers to it as elements of American grand 
strategy, but the intention is stressed in the NSS, elite speeches, and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom that the U.S. will act forcefully, and if necessary unilaterally, on 
behalf of maintaining peace in the world and protecting herself and her allies 
from potential harm from the use or proliferation of WMD.  In terms of 
international legitimacy, the U.S. derives legitimacy more from the ethical basis of 
fighting a just war than it does from rule-based legitimacy.  This did not prevent it, 
however, from seeking UN authorization for the involvement in Iraq while 
simultaneously arguing that any action against Iraq was already legitimate.  In 
terms of multilateral behavior, the evidence indicates that the predominant view 
of multilateralism that governed the invasion of Iraq was one of ad hoc coalition, 
not multilateral institutional behavior.  This did not prevent the U.S. from seeking 
as many international partners as possible. But theses international partners 
were portrayed as desirable, not necessary, based on a rhetoric that stressed 
that the U.S. would act alone if necessary.  Finally, the evidence suggests that 
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the portrayal of the use of force as a last resort was important for the U.S. 
decision to intervene in Iraq and that the events of 9/11 had proven that waiting 
any longer was an unacceptable risk that the U.S. was not willing to take.  These 
elements of U.S. strategic culture which resulted in the policy decision to invade 
Iraq are not necessarily the dominant elements of American strategic culture 
today, but were most dominant during this snapshot in time among the ruling 
elite. 
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V. CONCLUDING COMPARISON 
This study set out to discover the extent of the transatlantic security divide 
by comparing the emergent European strategic culture that is prevalent in ESDP 
activities with the American strategic culture that dominated the decision to 
invade Iraq.  The differences are stark and portray political entities that are 
sometimes diametrically opposed in their consideration of the topics presented in 
this study, but there is more commonality in the area of multilateralism than one 
might first suppose.  Before summarizing those differences, it is important to first 
reiterate the limits of this study and what it does not reveal.   
The title of this chapter was specifically chosen to help elucidate the point 
that this study consciously limited its focus.  By studying only four questions, it 
provides insight into only a portion of each entity’s strategic culture.  It also chose 
only one U.S. operation as a way to focus on what may be considered to be the 
transatlantic divide at its deepest point in a number of years.  Focusing only on 
what was jointly accomplished, as opposed to what was debated but not realized 
by ESDP, it focused on what was agreeable among Europeans.  Lastly, this 
study made no attempt to ascertain any devious reasons for intervention, but 
only focused on the reasons publicly articulated by the respective actors, thus 
potentially losing some richness of information, but also eliminating some 
controversy.  Even with these shortcomings there is valuable insight to be gained 
from the material at hand. 
In terms of the ideational foundation for action, the strategic culture 
reflected in ESDP activities is significantly different from the U.S. action in Iraq.  
The invasion of Iraq revealed a strategic culture that was based on a willingness 
to preemptively intervene in another country under the auspices of protecting the 
peace by preventing the spread of WMD.  The strategic culture surrounding 
ESDP activities, on the other hand, tend to largely rely on civilian intervention 
that promotes good governance, especially as concerns police and rule of law.  
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ESDP has not yet intervened preventively, and certainly not to affect regime 
change or prevent the proliferation of WMD.  ESDP does focus more on the 
causes of problems and exhibits a trend of intervening proactively to prevent 
outbreaks of violence. 
There is also a stark contrast in terms of international legitimacy based on 
two very different perceptions of how that legitimacy is derived.  On the one 
hand, the U.S. strategic culture derives legitimacy from both ethical and rule-
based sources.  The European Union, on the other hand, is deeply committed to 
rule-based legitimacy.  However, even though the EU presents itself as reliant on 
the UN for rule-based legitimacy, EU rhetoric leaves open the option of acting 
without an explicit mandate from the UN. This flexibility is now tested in the 
EULEX Kosovo rule of law mission that controversially bases its legitimacy on a 
1999 UN mandate issued in the wake of Operation Allied Force. 
There is more agreement in the area of multilateral behavior than one 
would potentially expect.  EU strategic culture is definitively one of multilateral 
institutional behavior, but it has certain aspects that are closer to the U.S. 
willingness to operate unilaterally.  Both actors exhibit openness to form 
temporary coalitions with willing and capable contributors to their operations.  
ESDP accepts partners from states that wish to join an EU operation (civilian or 
military), just as the U.S. was open to a coalition of willing partners in its 
intervention in Iraq, once multilateral UN action was unobtainable.  The fact that 
ESDP operations are only conducted after an unanimous vote also obscures the 
fact that participation of the EU member states is voluntary.  Thus, de facto the 
members who embark on the actual operation also form a coalition of willing 
states within the larger institutional process.  There is also rhetorical and 
documentation evidence that the EU is moving toward a less multilateral type of 
behavior with the potential ratification of the Lisbon treaty which includes 
‘permanent structured cooperation.’  This would allow a less than unanimous 
vote to authorize ESDP activity. Thus, the American and European approach to 
multilateralism is less diverse than their public rhetoric make us think. 
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Surprisingly, the strategic cultures of each entity with respect to the use of 
force as a last resort are opposite of what one might expect, but still very 
different.  The EU strategic culture does not rely on an early resort to force, but 
on an early resort to action that includes all of the EU’s tools.  Its culture 
considers early intervention as a better way of preventing crises than responding 
after the crises have already occurred.  On the other hand, the element of U.S. 
strategic culture found in the run-up to Iraq gave indication that it considered the 
use of force only after diplomacy had proven to be ineffective over the period of 
the previous twelve years.  It would be imprudent to purely accept this rhetoric at 
face value as there are strong indications of declaratory policy.  It can be argued, 
however, that elements within the U.S. strategic culture acknowledge that 
diplomacy must appear to be exhausted in order to gain support from the 
international community for an operation such as Iraq.  
The transatlantic rift, exposed in this case study is severe.  Especially 
deep are the different perceptions of legitimacy, reasons for an intervention, and 
how exhausted diplomacy must be before the use of force is considered.  The 
division between multilateral behavior is less severe, but still notable.  There are 
many promising signs (some that were not mentioned in this study) that the 
divide is already lessening.  The revision of the NSS in 2006 and the EU’s 
proposed permanent structured cooperation both indicate that the divide may be 
lessening.  The upcoming U.S. election could also potentially narrow the divide, 
depending on the national security policy of the incoming administration.  A 
follow-on to this study would consider any changes in U.S. policy since the 
invasion of Iraq and reconsider the EU strategic culture that is continually 
evolving, especially in light of EULEX Kosovo and the potential ratification and 
changes contained in the Lisbon Treaty. 
The final question after seeing the differences revealed by this structured 
focused case study is to ask: so what?  The answer is that it provides an 
understanding, or a snapshot, if you will, into elements of the respective strategic 
cultures at one of their most divisive periods.  The timeframe for ESDP analysis 
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was wider and provides a glimpse into the future of where the European strategic 
culture could be headed: a smaller, less multilateral force that could be used for 
more militaristic interventions than previously seen in ESDP.  One policy 
recommendation derived from this analysis is for the U.S. to recognize that 
cooperation with ESDP forces will be more successful when the mission is 
aligned with the strongest aspects of European strategic culture: comprehensive 
intervention in order to maintain the rule of law or stability in an area near 
Europe.  The transatlantic partnership could suffer worse fates than a burden 
sharing intervention that uses the strengths of U.S. hard power with the strengths 
of European civilian intervention, especially if these strengths were combined 
with a high degree of legitimacy.  This type of cooperation may be the best 
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